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  Thousands of American cities and towns are responding to social 
problems like bullying, drug abuse, and criminality by passing 
ordinances that hold individuals responsible for the wrongful acts of 
their family members and friends. Parental liability ordinances 
impose sanctions on parents when their children engage in bullying or 
other targeted behaviors; mandatory terms in rental housing leases 
require the eviction of tenants whose family members, friends, or 
guests engage in unlawful acts; and nuisance ordinances require 
evictions when a threshold number of calls to police is exceeded, even 
though such calls are often related to another person’s wrongful or 
abusive behavior. 
  Cities typically rely on home rule authority to pass these 
ordinances, and these ordinances in turn create new “home rules” for 
the households affected. These new home rules are a form of third-
party policing, and through them, the city is becoming an increasingly 
significant player in governing families and regulating intimate 
spaces. These home rules cut against the standard understanding of 
the home as mostly private and self-governed, and instead configure it 
as a site of state-required risk management and crime prevention. In 
so doing, these ordinances destabilize families and disrupt kinship 
structures, regardless of whether one is able to comply with them or 
not. Further, the ordinances allocate the burdens of preventing crime 
and managing risk in a manner inflected with gender, race, and class 
issues. Fortunately, the dynamism of localism can promise a better 
solution to the social problems that prompted these ordinances in the 
first place. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ability to “establish a home and bring up children” is a 
fundamental part of the American dream.1 Lately, however, residents 
in thousands of cities and towns across America are finding their 
 
 1. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
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ability to do this undermined by a number of local ordinances.2 These 
ordinances, passed in response to pressing social problems like 
bullying, criminality, and drug abuse, use strict or vicarious liability to 
hold parents and other heads of household legally responsible for the 
wrongful actions of their family members and friends.3 For example, 
parental liability ordinances threaten parents with fines and other 
penalties if they do not prevent their children from bullying others, or 
if their children engage in other targeted behaviors.4 Additionally, 
crime-free ordinances mandate that rental housing leases must 
include a “crime-free lease addendum,” which sets out how tenants 
will be evicted if their friends or family members commit an unlawful 
act on or near the leased premises. Similarly, nuisance laws require a 
tenant’s eviction from rental housing if a threshold number of calls to 
the police is exceeded, even if the basis for the calls is another 
person’s wrongful or abusive behavior. 
These laws can be understood as a form of third-party policing, 
an increasingly important form of regulation and law enforcement 
that is now often deployed to address social problems.5 In third-party 
policing, the state requires private parties—who neither participate in 
nor benefit from the misconduct they are compelled to address—to 
enforce laws and prevent misconduct by enacting some method of 
control over a primary wrongdoer.6 Failure to perform these assigned 
duties results in civil or criminal sanctions.7 
The private parties typically called upon to perform these 
enforcement duties are businesses, professionals, and industrial 
actors, and the sites that they are asked to police are typically public.8 
However, fairly early in its development, third-party policing began 
targeting a more intimate arena. Through parental liability laws and 
the “one-strike” policy for residents of federal public housing 
projects, tenants and parents were required to police their homes. 
 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 93–101 and 116–18. 
 3. Although “head of household” has a technical meaning as a filing status for individual 
income tax purposes, it is used here in a more generic sense, as a broad term that encompasses 
any adult, tenant of record, or parental figure who performs the role of taking care of a home 
and the people in it.  
 4. See infra notes 100–09 and accompanying text. 
 5. LORRAINE MAZEROLLE & JANET RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY POLICING 45–46 (2005).  
 6. REINIER H. KRAAKMAN, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986). 
 7. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 7. 
 8. Janet A. Gilboy, Compelled Third-Party Participation in the Regulatory Process: Legal 
Duties, Culture, and Noncompliance, 20 LAW & POL’Y 135, 135 (1998). 
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Both parental liability laws and the one-strike policy became 
popular in the late 1980s, the former in response to a perceived 
increased in juvenile crime and disorder, and the latter in response to 
extremely high crime rates in federal public housing projects.9 Under 
parental liability laws, parents were held legally responsible for the 
wrongful actions of their children. Under the one-strike policy, 
residents of federal public housing could be evicted if anyone 
associated with their household engaged in any criminal or drug-
related behavior on the premises.10 
Initially, significant bodies of scholarship grew up around both 
the parental liability laws and the one-strike policy.11 However, this 
scholarship tended to treat each as isolated phenomena and focused 
on parental liability laws at the state level, and the one-strike policy at 
the federal one. But, “in the shadow of the debate” about these 
policies, “local governments nationwide have quietly implemented 
 
 9. JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL LAW 229 (10th ed. 2010). Although the number of juveniles 
arrested for violent crime actually decreased in the period between 1978 and 1987, the number 
of those arrests that were for rape and aggravated assault went up. Kathryn J. Parsley, 
Constitutional Limitations on State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent 
Acts of Their Children, 44 VAND. L. REV. 441, 444 (1991). Further, the following year there was 
a drastic overall increase in juvenile arrests for violent crimes. Id. 
 10. For a discussion of the background and development of the one-strike policy, see 
generally Caroline Castle, Note, You Call That a Strike? A Post-Rucker Examination of 
Eviction from Public Housing Due to Drug-Related Criminal Activity of a Third Party, 37 GA. L. 
REV. 1435 (2003). Notably, in 2010, 86 percent of the evictions in federal housing projects in 
Chicago under the one-strike policy were for third-party activity. Laura Peterson, Collective 
Sanctions: Learning from the NFL’s Justifiable Use of Group Punishment, 14 TEX. REV. ENT. & 
SPORTS L. 165, 165 (2013). 
 11. Examples of scholarship focused on the federal one-strike policy include Regina 
Austin, “Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor Moms, Myths of Authority, and 
Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 275 (2002); 
Christopher Mele, The Civil Threat of Eviction and the Regulation and Control of U.S. Public 
Housing Communities, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 121, 130 (Christopher 
Mele & Teresa Miller eds., 2005); Bryan Cho, Note, Getting Evicted for the Actions of Others: A 
Proposed Amendment to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1229, 1234–35 (2003); 
Margaret E. Finzen, Note, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration 
and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 299, 313–14 
(2005); and Lisa Weil, Note, Drug-Related Evictions in Public Housing: Congress’ Addiction to a 
Quick Fix, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 171 (1991). Examples of scholarship focused on 
parental liability include Valerie D. Barton, Comment, Reconciling the Burden: Parental 
Liability for the Tortious Acts of Minors, 51 EMORY L.J. 877, 879 (2002); Jerry E. Tyler & 
Thomas W. Segady, Parental Liability Laws: Rationale, Theory, and Effectiveness, 37 SOC. SCI. J. 
79, 81–82 (2000); Jason Emilios Dimitris, Comment, Parental Responsibility Statutes—And the 
Programs That Must Accompany Them, 27 STETSON L. REV. 655, 662 (1997). This literature 
generally focuses on parental liability laws at the state level, and has not yet focused on how 
they combine with other laws to target the home at the local level. 
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programs that apply the same ‘one strike’ logic.”12 Crime-free lease 
addendums and chronic-nuisance-abatement ordinances use the same 
form of vicarious liability as the one-strike policy, and local law has 
now brought that vicarious liability to bear on a much larger portion 
of the population.13 An estimated 100 million people occupy 38.6 
million rental properties in America, and given that crime-free lease 
addendums and nuisance ordinances are currently present in nearly 
2000 cities and towns across the nation, many of these households are 
now subject to eviction based on the wrongdoing of others.14 Parental 
liability ordinances are expanding, too, both in terms of the scope of 
behaviors they encompass, and the increasing number of cities 
enacting them.15 
Despite their burgeoning numbers, the crime-free lease 
addendums, nuisance ordinances, and expanding parental liability 
ordinances have flown mostly under the radar of legal scholarship.16 
There are two reasons for this. First, the origin of these rules in local 
law has allowed them to proliferate mostly unnoticed. With the 
exception of a small group of prominent local-law scholars, the legal 
academy generally tends to overlook local law.17 And, as a practical 
point, the breadth and variances between jurisdictions make it a 
difficult area to empirically or sometimes even qualitatively study.18 
The second reason that these ordinances have proliferated 
relatively unremarked is that third-party policing itself is “generally 
 
 12. Scott Duffield Levy, Note, The Collateral Consequences of Seeking Order Through 
Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction Program, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539, 540 (2008) 
(emphasis added). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Janet Hawkins, Landlord Accountability and Crime Prevention, 63 CRIME 
PREVENTION 66, 66 (2011).  
 15. Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 1327, 1340 (2008). 
 16.  But see generally Mishran Wroe, Preemption of Municipal Crime-Free Housing 
Ordinances, 2 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 123 (2014) (arguing that the Fair Housing 
Act preempts crime-free ordinances); Nicole Livanos, Crime-Free Housing Ordinances: One 
Call Away From Eviction, 19 PUB. INT. L. REP. 106 (2014) (discussing the impact of crime-free 
ordinances on victims of crime). 
 17. For instance, Professor Ethan Leib notes that “legal scholars have almost universally 
ignored the law in local courts, favoring the study of federal courts and state appellate courts.” 
Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 898–99 (2013).  
 18. Fortunately, new online databases like Municode are opening up research possibilities 
in local law. See Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 
1125 (2012). 
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invisible.”19 Because it appears in many different contexts, and 
sometimes merely repurposes old laws that were originally enacted 
for other reasons, third-party policing has only just begun to attract 
the scholarly attention of a few pioneering academics.20 Third-party 
policing practices are ubiquitous, but its emergence as an “articulated 
or developed doctrine” is still in its infancy, and while the literature is 
growing, there has not yet been widespread examination of third-
party policing activities and practices.21 
This Article offers an examination and excavation of the 
nationwide trend of cities and towns enacting ordinances that use 
vicarious liability to hold household and family members responsible 
for the actions of others. These laws can be understood as “home rule 
ordinances,” a term that highlights three important features shared by 
these ordinances. First, home rule ordinances create a new standard 
of home governance that parents and heads of household must meet 
to avoid legal sanction. In other words, the ordinances create a set of 
“home rules” that apply to the internal workings of home life. 
Second, they establish rules about who gets to have a home at all; that 
is, they serve as a sorting rule, setting parameters for home-
worthiness in a broader sense. The ability to keep one’s home 
becomes contingent on one’s ability to control the behavior of 
another person, and if a tenant fails to demonstrate such control, 
eviction can follow.22 And, finally, the ordinances are home rule 
ordinances in another, more literal sense: they typically rely on a 
city’s home rule authority for their existence.23 Home rule ordinances 
 
 19. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 50. 
 20. Such academics include Michael Buerger, Reinier Kraakman, Lorraine Mazerolle, and 
Janet Ransley. Other scholars have used different terminology to describe the same or similar 
phenomena, such as “plural policing” or “third-party liability systems.” See, for example, Ian 
Loader, Plural Policing and Democratic Governance, 9 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 323, 324 (2000) 
(plural policing) and Gilboy, supra note 8, at 135 (third-party liability systems).  
 21. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 50. 
 22. For low-income tenants, evictions often result in homelessness. See infra text 
accompanying notes 271–98. The use of home rule ordinances as a mechanism for displacing 
people has important implications for housing discrimination. As Desmond and others write, 
“Our efforts to monitor and reduce housing discrimination have been almost entirely 
concentrated on getting in; we have overlooked, meanwhile, the process of getting (put) out.” 
Matthew Desmond, Weihua An, Richelle Winkler & Thomas Ferriss, Evicting Children, 92 SOC. 
FORCES 303, 304 (2013).  
 23. Home rule can be understood as a method by which state governments can transfer 
power to local governments, thereby allowing local governments “autonomy in the management 
of their local affairs.” James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York: ‘The Ghost of 
Home Rule,’ 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 713 n.1 (1985). 
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are passed as part of a city’s power to regulate its own local or 
municipal affairs, and have faced challenges on the basis that they 
exceed the grant of home rule authority.24 
This Article argues that although these home rule ordinances 
seem to hold some initial appeal, they are deeply problematic. They 
place an undue burden on familial and intimate relationships, 
undermine our legal, cultural, and aspirational notions of home, and 
represent an attempt by municipalities to regulate highly intimate 
spaces and alter people’s home lives. Through these ordinances, cities 
coerce friends and family members into serving as “‘intimate 
handler[s],’” and into becoming part of “networks of security 
production.”25 This “networked governance” governs both the 
watchers and the watched,26 and has important implications for 
privacy, for parenting rights, for who can establish a home, and for 
how people must parent. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates home rule 
ordinances in the context of third-party policing, and describes how a 
series of shifts in governance created a political landscape in which 
third-party policing measures could flourish. Part II describes how 
home rule ordinances establish the home as a site of risk 
management, crime prevention, and security production, compelling 
parents and heads of household to engage in a variety of surveillance 
and compliance behaviors. Part III explores the role of vicarious 
liability, fault, and vulnerability in home rule ordinances. Next, Part 
IV considers the consequences of noncompliance with home rule 
ordinances, including stigma, fines, and eviction. Part V first considers 
the current legal avenues for challenging home rule ordinances. Part 
V then argues that cities should consider moving away from home 
rule ordinances, and offers some alternative interventions that cities 
could employ to address the broader, structural issues often 
underlying problems involving misconduct, criminality, and drug use. 
The Article concludes by suggesting that home rule ordinances 
are transforming the “right to maintain control” over one’s home into 
a duty to control all the people connected to that home, and deter 
 
 24. See infra note 335. 
 25. Marcus Felson, Routine Activities and Crime Prevention in the Developing Metropolis, 
25 CRIMINOLOGY 911, 912 (1987); Jennifer Wood, Networked Policing for the Future 1 (June 1, 
2005), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/265303410_Networked_Policing_for_the_Future. 
 26. Wood, supra note 25. 
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them from engaging in wrongful conduct.27 Such a duty is likely 
impossible to fulfill, and the attempt to comply with it can fracture 
familial and social bonds in ways that actually contribute to, rather 
than prevent, the social problems that initially prompted these 
ordinances. 
I.  THIRD-PARTY POLICING AS A RESPONSE TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
This Part describes how third-party policing came to be a 
popular response to many social issues. Part I.A chronicles the growth 
of third-party policing out of a series of shifts in governance. With the 
late modern state’s shift from sovereignty to governmentality, and 
from welfarism to neoliberalism, crime has emerged as a new 
paradigm for governance. The criminal paradigm is now applied in a 
variety of contexts, including the context of social issues that used to 
lie outside of its purview. Crime fighting also encompasses a variety 
of new tools. One of these new tools is a focus on the potential of 
third parties to control crime. Home rule ordinances are part of this 
trend. 
Part I.B offers a more detailed sketch of each of the three types 
of ordinances that comprise the new home rules: parental liability 
ordinances, crime-free lease ordinances, and nuisance ordinances. 
These ordinances use strict vicarious liability to hold a parent or head 
of household responsible for the wrongful actions of another 
household member. 
A. The Rise of Third-Party Policing 
In modern Western societies, legal norms have traditionally been 
enforced through direct deterrence.28 Lately, though, in their struggle 
to address complex social problems, governments at all levels are 
turning to third-party policing.29 Third-party policing tries to deter 
unlawful conduct by coercing a third party into performing activities 
that will discourage a potential primary wrongdoer.30 To motivate 
private parties to perform these policing duties upon primary 
 
 27. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993); see Javinsky-
Wenzek v. City of St. Louis Park, 829 F. Supp. 2d 787, 797 (D. Minn. 2011) (quoting James 
Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53). 
 28. Kraakman, supra note 6, at 56; see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 516 (2001) (“The 
normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to punish the person engaging in it.”). 
 29. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 30. Id.  
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wrongdoers, third-party policing relies on a number of “legal levers”: 
regulatory, civil, or criminal sanctions that befall those who fail to 
police properly.31 
Third-party policing is now used to solve myriad “pressing social 
problems,” at local, national, and international levels.32 For instance, 
if juvenile vandalism or destruction of property is a problem in a 
particular community, that community may try to hold the parents 
liable for the costs of that damage.33 Similarly, if sweatshop factories 
are an issue for a particular nation, that nation may hold 
manufacturers liable for their subcontractors’ violations of federal 
laws, and may also co-opt retailers into the policing project to 
decrease the end market for these products.34 The key is that a third 
party, thought to have some means of controlling the actions of a 
targeted party, is compelled by the threat of legal sanction to perform 
policing activities that could accomplish this goal. 
The growing popularity of third-party policing as a solution to 
social problems can be traced to three shifts in modern governance.35 
First, there is a “movement from sovereignty to governmentality.”36 
Under sovereignty, the state used “force and domination” to maintain 
its power both on the international stage and within its own borders.37 
Under governmentality, however, the state uses a different set of 
tools. Instead of force and domination, governmentality relies on 
subtler “technologies of governance.”38 These tools are “more diffuse 
and spread over institutions both of the state and civil society” and 
result in “individuals governing themselves” and one another.39 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Gilboy, supra note 8, at 140. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 5. 
 36. Id. at 7 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON (1st ed. 1977)).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 13; see James Hay, Unaided Virtues: The (Neo)Liberalization of the Domestic 
Sphere and the New Architecture of Community, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, CULTURAL STUDIES, 
AND GOVERNMENTALITY 165, 166 (Jack Z. Bratich, Jeremy Packer & Cameron McCarthy eds., 
2003) (discussing how the government “came to rely less upon political institutions . . . and to 
develop techniques for governing at a distance” by using practices that individuals “in their 
freedom can use in dealing with each other”); Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On 
Market-Embedded Morality, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 8 (2008) (“[R]esponsibilization operates at 
the level of individual actors . . . to mobilize designated actors actively to undertake and 
perform self-governing tasks.”). 
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The configuration of individuals as “responsible for their own 
governance” is also part of a second political shift, from “welfarism to 
neoliberalism.”40 Under neoliberalism, individuals are not controlled 
or policed in the traditional sense. Instead, they are recruited into 
policing and regulating themselves and others.41 These duties are 
justified not only on the grounds of ability—that is, the idea that 
members of the community could and therefore should prevent 
crime—but also on the grounds of responsibility.42 “‘[T]he 
community’” becomes “‘the all-purpose solution’” to every social 
issue, not only because community members can help prevent crime 
and related problems, “but also because some were found to be 
responsible for it.”43 
Professor David Garland’s theory of “responsibilization” helps 
explain how this works.44 He notes that in managing populations, 
governments now tend to act not directly, through their own state 
agencies, but instead indirectly, through nonstate actors.45 As he puts 
it, the current “primary concern” of government is “to devolve 
responsibility for crime prevention on to agencies, organizations and 
individuals which are quite outside the state and to persuade them to 
act appropriately.”46 Ultimately, the state “is seeking to implement 
‘social’ and ‘situational’ forms of crime prevention which involve the 
re-ordering of the conduct of everyday life right across the social 
field,” including the home.47 Whereas the state’s initial target for 
 
 40. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 23. The authors describe how between 
World War II and the 1960s, “the dominant Western framework was a Keynesian one, where 
the welfarist state operated through the government to control and regulate the economy, 
society and the provision of services to the community. In this conception of the state, 
government is everything and all social, economic, regulatory and political action occurs within 
its framework.” Id. at 8.  
 41. Mele, supra note 11, at 130. Also, “[a]t the urban level, neoliberalism has important 
implications for the spatial development and governance of cities, which in turn affect patterns 
of crime, governance of police departments, and policing strategies and priorities.” Jeremy 
Kaplan-Lyman, Note, A Punitive Bind: Policing, Poverty, and Neoliberalism in New York City, 
15 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 177, 180 (2012); see Ian Loader, Plural Policing and 
Democratic Governance, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (2000) (“We inhabit a world of plural, 
networked policing.”). 
 42. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of 
Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117, 119 (2013). 
 43. Id. (emphasis added). 
 44. David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in 
Contemporary Society, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 452 (1996). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 454. 
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transformative action was the individual wrongdoer, it now seeks to 
alter “the norms, the routines, and the consciousness of everyone,” in 
order to make crime prevention a part of everyone’s quotidian 
culture and practice.48 
Indeed, a third shift in modern governance is that crime itself has 
become a mode of governance in America.49 Beginning in the 1960s, 
the United States has increasingly engaged in “governing through 
crime.”50 The tools of criminal law, like “criminalization, 
incarceration, [and] police intervention,” are brought in as the answer 
to nearly every social problem, even those once considered well 
beyond the reach of criminal law.51 Crime control has infiltrated areas 
and zones of personal lives that were once believed to be largely 
outside its scope, and has become “the funnel through which all other 
policy interventions flow.”52 It is now “the central metaphor through 
which government intervention and coercion is justified” and 
rationalized.53 
In addition to the ever-expanding scope of criminal law, the 
kinds of interventions and coercive tools used in the name of fighting 
crime have become more diverse over time. For instance, civil 
remedies are now also often used in service of crime control. In the 
1980s, problem-oriented policing started using civil ordinances to 
accomplish its goals, a practice that has continued to grow.54 Civil 
ordinances provide the criminal law with an even greater sphere of 
impact and are able to access areas of private life that were once 
unavailable to it.55 The National Institute of Justice, for instance, 
suggests that “one of the most important advantages of using civil 
remedies” is their ability to reach “beyond the scope of the criminal 
law” and control behavior that the criminal law could not access.56 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. See generally JONATHON SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME (2009) (asserting that 
since the 1960s, communities have slowly become governed through crime). 
 50. Id. at 1. 
 51. Levy, supra note 12, at 539. The school-to-prison pipeline is a good example of the 
expanding reach of the criminal law. School-to-Prison Pipeline, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/school-prison-pipeline (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
 52. Levy, supra note 12, at 577; see also Kaplan-Lyman, supra note 41, at 180. 
 53. Kaplan-Lyman, supra note 41, at 188. 
 54. Michael E. Buerger, The Politics of Third-Party Policing, 9 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 
89, 91 (1998).  
 55. For a description of this expansion of criminal law, see generally SIMON, supra note 49. 
 56. Levy, supra note 12, at 577. 
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Many of the civil ordinances that are used in service of the 
criminal law concern land. In fact, crime management has recently 
turned away from traditional enforcement methods and toward “land 
management responses.”57 One legal scholar suggests that this shift is 
the result of “[t]he Warren Court’s ‘criminal procedure revolution,’” 
which placed constitutional limits on how police could impose social 
order.58 Land-management solutions like “stricter housing codes, 
trespass zoning, and homeless campuses,” which avoid such 
procedural and constitutional complications, thereby became an 
attractive option for policymakers.59 Accordingly, the application of 
civil-law tools like “nuisance abatement, forfeiture, and eviction” to 
problems originally approached through the criminal law has been 
dramatically increasing.60 
The shifts from sovereignty to governmentality, from welfarism 
to neoliberalism, and from traditional law-enforcement techniques to 
land-management tools have generated third-party policing as an 
important new technology of governance, one that is frequently relied 
upon as part of the state’s crime-fighting apparatus.61 Indeed, “the 
extensive use of third parties” has become “[o]ne of the most striking 
features of contemporary social regulation.”62 Many of these third-
party policing schemes compel multiple third parties to perform 
policing duties. 
As the new focus on land-management responses suggests, third-
party policing often involves monitoring and obtaining control over a 
specific geographical site.63 A common example of this form of third-
party policing involves taverns or bars. Usually, after discovering a 
problem associated with a particular drinking establishment, such as 
drunk and disorderly patrons, the police will ask the third party to 
perform some activity that is not normally part of its business 
 
 57. Id. at 548 n.61 (citing Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 
1078 (2005)). Examples of land-management responses include “stricter housing codes, trespass 
zoning, and homeless campuses.” Id. 
 58. Garnett, supra note 57, at 1082. 
 59. Levy, supra note 12, at 548 n.61 (citing Garnett, supra note 57, at 1082). 
 60. Id. at 549. 
 61. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 117–18. 
 62. Gilboy, supra note 8, at 137. Historically, policing was actually an activity performed by 
citizens, as “[e]very man had a responsibility to secure his own neighborhood through the 
obligation to join in the ‘hue and cry’ and to keep in his house a stash of arms for the specific 
purpose of maintaining the peace.” Julie Ayling & Peter Grabosky, Policing by Command: 
Enhancing Law Enforcement Capacity Through Coercion, 28 LAW & POL’Y 420, 421 (2006). 
 63. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 84. 
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practices.64 This action can be a change to the physical environment, 
like constructing a barrier, adding lighting, or installing more access 
controls, or it can be a change to business behaviors, like adopting 
screening protocols for tenants or implementing rules of conduct for 
patrons.65 If the third party accedes to the request, all is well.66 If not, a 
“legal lever” will be deployed to coerce compliance.67 For instance, 
bar owners who fail to make the requested change may “find 
themselves the subject of an unscheduled health or building code 
inspection, or other regulatory action.”68 
Another popular legal lever is the extension of liability from the 
primary wrongdoer to the secondary wrongdoer—a “gatekeeper” or 
“enabler”—who has the ability to “disrupt the wrongdoing” by either 
withholding services or performing some other preventive measure.69 
A common example of gatekeeping liability occurs when lawyers or 
accountants are held liable for the fraudulent security transactions of 
their clients.70 
Although there is not yet much hard data studying the 
effectiveness of third-party policing,71 these schemes have been 
rapidly replicating and reproducing themselves.72 This is a common 
occurrence in lawmaking: 
 
 64. Michael Buerger, Third-Party Policing: Futures and Evolutions, in POLICING 2020: 
EXPLORING THE FUTURE OF CRIME, COMMUNITIES, AND POLICING 452, 454 (Joseph A. 
Schafer ed., 2007). 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 454–56. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 455.  
 69. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 365 (2003).  
 70. Id. The police or state actors have only a minor role in this version of third-party 
policing, generally consisting of “educating third parties about their potential liability or ways to 
reduce it.” MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 95. 
 71. Mazerolle and Ransley note that “very little discourse surrounds third party policing 
activities and there exists very little systematic assessment of third party policing practices.” Id. 
at 50. Similarly, Professor Greg Koehle states that “very little research has been conducted on 
third party policing programs, and even less on the party expected to fulfill the third party 
policing role.” Greg Koehle, Controlling Crime and Disorder in Rental Properties: The 
Perspective of the Rental Property Manager, 14 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 53, 54 (2013). 
 72. For a detailed account of the increasing prevalence of third-party policing, see 
generally MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5. As another example, the city of Escondido, 
California, enacted an ordinance entitled “Establishing Penalties for the Harboring of Illegal 
Aliens in the City of Escondido.” Under this ordinance, landlords who “let, lease[d], or rent[ed] 
a dwelling unit to an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has 
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law” would face civil and 
criminal sanctions. See Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1048 (2006). 
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Political scientists have noted the interesting phenomenon in 
legislative activity that over time certain notions or ways of dealing 
with problems become prominent (perhaps in part because of 
perceptions of their past success in solving problems) and these 
solutions come to be attached by decision makers to a wide range of 
problems as they come to their attention.73 
Cities have been particularly keen on turning to third-party 
policing as a solution to social problems.74 Perhaps surprisingly, in an 
era of globalization and the simultaneous rise of both nation-states 
and supranational governing bodies, the role of local governments 
and municipalities has not been diminished.75 On the contrary, there is 
a growing “dialectical relationship” between local governments and 
these larger bodies of governance, such that local governments have 
managed to “not only persist in the age of ‘globalization’ but to 
actually acquire importance and new . . . powers.”76 
Local governments, seeking to address social issues like bullying, 
drug abuse, and other criminal or undesirable behaviors, are 
increasingly turning to third-party policing as the answer. Continuing 
the new tradition of characterizing social problems as criminal issues, 
cities and municipalities across the nation are increasingly enacting 
ordinances that piggyback onto criminal behaviors and require third 
parties to monitor and control the behavior of others. 
In particular, cities are increasingly pushing third-party policing 
into the home and using it as a tool to govern households.77 Initially, 
 
 73. Gilboy, supra note 8, at 139. 
 74. Professor Jeffrey Parness states that cities have also been using third-party policing for 
more mundane purposes, like municipal automated-traffic-enforcement schemes. Under this 
form of enforcement, cameras capture driving infractions and the city issues tickets to vehicle 
owners, regardless of who was driving at the time of the infraction. This results in a “form of 
strict liability for secondary culprits,’ those owning the vehicles.” Jeffrey A. Parness, Beyond 
Red Light Enforcement Against the Guilty But Innocent: Local Regulations of Secondary 
Culprits, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 259, 259 (2011). The justification for this imposition is that 
the “secondary culprits” have some “ability to control the ‘primary culprits,’ those using the 
vehicles,” and should use that ability to ensure adherence to the rules of the road. Id. This 
system of regulation mimics the principal’s liability doctrine found in tort law. 
 75. Mariana Valverde, Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of 
Seeing in Urban Governance, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 277, 307 (2011). 
 76. Id. at 307–08 (noting that this is “in part because of their ability to serve new functions 
and become a tool of global rather than local capital”). 
 77. Perhaps surprisingly, the very idea of policing has deep historical and etymological 
connections to both households and third parties. For much of “Western political history,” 
“police” referred not to uniformed individuals who drive squad cars and arrest people, but 
instead to “the hierarchical mode of governance in which the polis is treated as a household 
rather than a gathering of autonomous equals.” Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences, in 
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in the middle of the last century, municipalities tried to police social 
disorder by focusing on outside spaces, through ordinances such as 
vagrancy and loitering laws.78 However, in the 1960s courts began 
striking down these laws,79 so cities began refocusing the attention 
from external to internal spaces, and “reached into a sector 
previously untouched by vagrancy laws: the home.”80 Cities “were 
able to do so, in part, because the recent criminalization of domestic 
violence allowed—indeed, required—the expansion of criminal law 
into private space.”81 Once the home had been opened up to legal 
intervention in this way, other criminal and civil laws entered the 
home, a space the legal system had begun to envision as not solely 
private, but instead “‘in need of public control, like the streets.’”82 
Cities began to focus on curing disorder inside the home, and 
intervening in that formerly private space, in order to promote the 
broader goal of order and security in the city. 
B. The Home Rule Ordinances 
Home rule ordinances have emerged from this overall landscape. 
They follow this tradition of envisioning homes “‘as in need of public 
control’” in order to promote the interests of reducing crime and 
increasing security.83 The ordinances are designed with “the self-
conscious purpose of leveraging familial solidarity” to both directly 
 
LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION 77–123, 105 (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & 
Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2011) (citing Markus D. Dubber, Regulatory and Legal Aspects 
of Penalty, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION, supra, at 19, 19–49 (Austin Sarat, 
Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2011)). Further, prior to the establishment 
of modern police forces, “‘policing’ itself was a third-party obligation, imposed or offered to 
citizens.” Buerger, supra note 64, at 458.  
 78. See Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120. 
 79. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (placing constitutional 
limitations on loitering statutes); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) 
(striking down a vagrancy ordinance); Parker v. Mun. Judge, 427 P.2d 642, 643–44 (Nev. 1967) 
(holding the ordinance unconstitutional because it punished the status of poverty). 
 80. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120 (quotation mark omitted). 
 81. Id. (citing Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006)). It should 
be noted, however, that the focus on homes is in addition to, not instead of, the focus on public 
spaces. Cities continue to engage in “urban social control” through regulating public spaces, 
through now they often rely on new legal mechanisms to do so. See Katherine Beckett & Steve 
Herbert, Dealing with Disorder: Social Control in the Post-Industrial City, 12 THEORETICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 5, 6 (2008). 
 82. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120 (quoting JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE 
LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 11 (2009)).  
 83. Id.  
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and indirectly deter potential wrongdoers.84 The possibility of a 
negative impact on friends and family members is meant to directly 
dissuade potential wrongdoers from engaging in unlawful behaviors. 
At the same time, the ordinances are also meant to indirectly deter 
wrongdoing, by eliciting a series of behaviors from those friends and 
family members that will ward against criminal activity.85 Family 
members and friends are thereby implicated “in the responsibility and 
liability for the management” of the risk of wrongdoing.86 The three 
ordinances discussed below—parental liability ordinances, crime-free 
lease ordinances, and nuisance ordinances—attempt to achieve the 
goal of public security by controlling “not just individual behaviors,” 
but also “broader social arrangements—where and how people 
live.”87 
1. Parental Liability Ordinances.  Desperate to stop youth 
bullying and the suicides connected to it, many cities are now passing 
or considering passing ordinances that hold parents responsible for 
their children’s bullying or other wrongdoing.88 Bullying and 
 
 84. Levinson, supra note 69, at 413. 
 85. Id. (discussing the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which was “designed to 
conscript family members to police and prevent their relatives’ criminal behavior”).  
 86. Mele, supra note 11, at 130. 
 87. Levy, supra note 12, at 540. 
 88. At the time of this writing, the cities that have passed ordinances holding parents 
vicariously liable for their children’s bullying behavior include Monona, Wisconsin (population 
7715, a suburb of Madison); Detroit, Michigan (population 701,475); Village of Mount Horeb, 
Wisconsin (population 7294) (using the same language as the Monona ordinance); and Kansas 
City, Missouri (population 464,310). See DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-3-44 
(2011); KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 50-244 (2013); MONONA, WIS., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 11-2-17 (2013); MOUNT HOREB, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES 2013-14 (2013). 
Population numbers are taken from CITY DATA, http://www.city-data.com (last visited Jan. 17, 
2015). 
  Carson City, California (population 93,000), voted on but ultimately rejected such an 
ordinance. Part of the opposition to the bill was based on the idea that it could be used in a 
racially discriminatory manner, to “further criminalize Black and Brown youth.” Charlene 
Muhammad, Punishing Bullies or Targeting Black Youth?, FINAL CALL (May 22, 2014, 9:19 
AM), http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/National_News_2/article_101450.shtml. The 
ordinance called for a one-hundred-dollar fine for the first violation, two hundred dollars for the 
second, and “a fine and counseling for the entire family” following a third violation. Id. The law 
also provided that “[a]nyone between 18-25 who participates in or encourages bullying or 
cyberbullying would also face misdemeanor charges.” Id. Benton Harbor, Michigan (population 
10,040), also considered a bullying ordinance that would hold parents liable for their children’s 
bullying. First offences would require community service, and subsequent offenses would attract 
fines of seventy-four to five hundred dollars. That proposal is currently tabled. Barbara 
Harrington, Proposed Anti-Bullying Ordinance Carries Strict Punishments, WNDU.COM (Dec. 
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“bullycides” are now a major social issue across the nation and 
frequently dominate news headlines.89 A recent Psychology Today 
article describes the coverage and scope of the problem: “It’s 
relentless. Virtually every week the media informs us about another 
new tragedy of a young person taking his or her own life because they 
could no longer tolerate being bullied.”90 Bullying is understood in the 
popular imagination to be an extremely common and extremely 
dangerous social problem among kids and teens. The American 
Medical Association states that 3.2 million children have been bullied, 
and other studies suggest that 42 percent of children have 
experienced online bullying.91 Celebrities and not-for-profit 
organizations have launched a number of campaigns to combat the 
 
18, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.wndu.com/home/headlines/Proposed-anti-bullying-ordinance-
carries-strict-punishments--236489351.html.  
  Milton, Wisconsin (population 5549), has a bullying ordinance that holds only the child, 
not the parent accountable. See Eric Schulzke, Could Bullying and Harassment Become a 
Criminal Offense?, DESERT NEWS NAT’L (May 22, 2014), http://national.deseretnews
.com/article/1526/Could-bullying-and-harassment-become-a-criminal-offense.html. Marshfield, 
Massachusetts (population 24,324), and Dexter, Missouri (population 7864), have similar 
ordinances. See Jonathon Dawe, Ballot Issue Won’t Change Procedure for DPD, DAILY 
STATESMAN (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.dailystatesman.com/story/2105774.html; Raymond 
Neupert, Marshfield Passes Cyber Bullying Ordinance, WDEZ (Apr. 18, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://
wdez.com/news/articles/2011/apr/18/marshfield-passes-cyber-bullying-ordinance. A nonparental 
bullying ordinance was also considered in East Greenwich, Rhode Island (population 13,146). 
See Barbara Polichetti, East Greenwich, RI Considers Anti-Bullying Ordinance, E. GREENWICH 
F.A.C.E.S. (Jan. 27, 2011, 10:50 PM), http://www.eastgreenwichfaces.org/apps/blog/show/
5966854-east-greenwich-ri-considers-anti-bullying-ordinance.  
 89. For examples of these headlines, see Jeff Coltin, Strike a Chord: Does Bullying Cause 
Suicide?, WFUV.ORG (Nov. 6, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.wfuv.org/news/news-politics/141106/
strike-chord-does-bullying-cause-suicide; Corinne Lestch, Distraught South Carolina Mom Says 
Bullying Drove Son To Commit Suicide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 21, 2014, 4:38 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/south-carolina-mom-bullying-drove-son-commit-
suicide-article-1.2019446; Chris Minor, Local Parents Combat “Suicide by Bullying” After 12-
Year-Old Daughter’s Death, WQAD8 (Nov. 6, 2014, 10:00 PM), http://wqad.com/2014/
11/06/local-parents-combat-suicide-by-bullying-after-12-year-old-daughters-death. The term 
“bullycide” was coined in NEIL MARR & TIM FIELD, BULLYCIDE: DEATH AT PLAYTIME 1 
(2001). It is a controversial term, as it seems to ignore the intervening act of the victim’s suicide, 
instead attributing that act to the bully’s wrongdoing. Bullycide, STOP BULLYCIDE NOW (May 
16, 2014), http://stopbullycidenow.weebly.com/observation-blog-entry/bullycide. 
 90. Izzy Kalman, Why Are So Many Kids Committing Bullycide?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 
11, 2012), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/psychological-solution-bullying/201201/why-
are-so-many-kids-committing-bullycide. 
 91. Kathy Quinn, KCMO Council Passes Anti-Bullying Ordinance That Fines Parents for 
Kids’ Bullying, FOX4KC.COM (Aug. 15, 2013, 8:35 AM), http://fox4kc.com/2013/08/15/kcmo-
council-considers-anti-bullying-ordinance-that-fines-parents-for-kids-bullying. 
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problem, and the law continues to explore the role and 
responsibilities of schools and parents in combatting bullying.92 
At the state level, many legislatures are exploring the potential 
of parental liability statutes to address the problem. For instance, 
following the bullying-related suicide of twelve-year-old Rebecca 
Sedwick, some Florida lobbyists are attempting to craft legislation 
that would hold parents criminally liable for their children’s bullying 
behavior.93 Also, in Iowa, a bill imposing parental liability for bullying 
behavior was drafted and proposed.94 The rationale underlying these 
proposed state laws is that poor parenting causes juvenile 
misconduct.95 Proponents of these laws believe that “parents will 
spend more time and effort in monitoring the activities of their 
children if they know they will be held responsible for their children’s 
actions,” and that this monitoring will be an effective deterrent to 
bullying.96 
Not content to wait for the sometimes laborious political process 
to work itself out at the state level, however, cities have forged ahead 
 
 92. For example, activists Dan Savage and Terry Miller started the It Gets Better Project 
(www.itgetsbetter.org), a web-based campaign focused on helping gay youths who experience 
bullying. What is the It Gets Better Project?, IT GETS BETTER PROJECT (last visited Jan. 16, 
2015).  
 93. Bullying Felony Charges Right or Wrong?, USATODAY (Oct. 20, 2013, 5:10 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/10/20/cyber-bullying-rebecca-sedwick-charges-
florida-column/3110697. 
 94. H.F. 143, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2013), available at http://coolice.legis.iowa
.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=billinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=false&hbill=hf143; 
Heather Leigh, Iowa Bill Could Hold Parents Responsible for Bullying, SIOUXLAND NEWS, 
http://www.siouxlandnews.com/story/17590770/iowa-bill-could-hold-parents-responsible-for-
bullying (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Mike Wiser, Branstad Sees Hope in Another Anti-Bullying 
Summit, SIOUX CITY JOURNAL (July 7, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/
local/a1/branstad-sees-hope-in-another-anti-bullying-summit/article_69a59e21-8b70-573d-b5fc-
95773d8dc003.html. It ultimately failed to pass during the 2014 legislative session. Connie Ryan 
Terrel, Slate Needs to Try Again on Anti-Bullying Bill, DES MOINES REGISTER (May 24, 2014, 
11:17 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2014/05/25/
state-try-bullying-bill/9561923.  
 95. This is not a new idea. As Professor Leslie John Harris notes, “Family historian John 
Demos traced the antecedents of contemporary parental responsibility statutes at least to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when poor parents would be summoned to court, 
admonished, and if they did not improve, have their children taken away.” Leslie Joan Harris, 
An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws: Sending Messages, but What Kind and To 
Whom?, 1 UTAH L. REV. 5, 7 (2006). 
 96. Parental Liability Laws, JOHN HOWARD SOC’Y OF ALTA., http://www.johnhoward. 
ab.ca/pub/C11.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). For a discussion of the similar reasoning 
underlying parental liability laws in tort, see generally Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the 
Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. REV. 533 (2013). 
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with their own ordinances. In June 2013, the city of Monona, 
Wisconsin, attracted widespread media attention when it passed a city 
ordinance holding parents liable for their children’s bullying 
behaviors.97 The ordinance offers a definition of bullying and other 
prohibited behaviors, and then provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful 
for any custodial parent or guardian of any unemancipated person 
under eighteen (18) years of age to allow or permit such person to 
violate the provision[ ][prohibiting bullying] above.”98 
Under the Monona ordinance, parents who violate the provision 
may be fined between $50 and $1000 (“plus ‘the costs of 
prosecution’”) for a first offense, and double that for additional 
violations.99 According to Monona’s police chief, the fines will be 
levied only in situations in which the parents are uncooperative and 
do not make an effort to address the bullying.100 Other cities have 
followed Monona’s lead. For example, in Kansas City, Missouri, the 
 
 97. Carol Kuruvilla, Parents of Bullies in Wisconsin Town to Be Fined for Their Kids’ Bad 
Behavior, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 4, 2013, 5:27 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/parents-bullies-fined-kids-behavior-article-1.1363172. No parents had been fined under 
the ordinance as of April 25, 2014. Parents Learn About Monona Bullying Ordinance, 
MCFARLAND THISTLE (Apr. 25, 2014, 6:15 AM), http://www.hngnews.com/mcfarland
_thistle/news/local/article74497836-cb06-11e3-9d87-001a4bcf6878.html. However, Monona 
Police Det. Sgt. Ryan Losby, who spearheaded the efforts to enact the ordinance, believes that 
its presence on the books has been an effective deterrent, because “no one wants to fork out 
$144 for no reason.” Id. The town of McFarland, Wisconsin, was interested in passing a similar 
ordinance, though the police chief there expressed concerns with the potential legality, and 
advocated for “in-depth family counseling and behavior modification training” as a better 
alternative. Id. 
 98. MONONA, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11-2-17 (2013). The ordinance also states 
that notice serves as a rebuttable presumption that a parent allowed or permitted the bullying:  
The fact that prior to the present offense a parent, guardian or custodian was 
informed in writing by a law enforcement officer of a separate violation of [the 
provision prohibiting bullying] by the same minor occurring within ninety (90) days 
prior to the present offense shall constitute a rebuttable presumption that such 
parent, guardian or custodian allowed or permitted the present violation. 
Id. Presumably, a parent could rebut the presumption with evidence that she took reasonable 
steps to prohibit the behavior. In a similar instance, a court held that a statute that created 
parental liability for a child’s wrongful act, subject to the defense that the “person took 
reasonable steps to control the conduct of the child at the time” in question, was still vicarious 
liability because there was no identifiable act or omission that served as the predicate for 
culpability. See City of Maple Heights v. Ephraim, 898 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
 99. Eugene Volokh, Ban on Behavior That “Emotionally Abuse[s]” or “Is Likely to Create 
an Offensive Environment” and “Which Serves No Legitimate Purpose” + Liability for Parents 




 100. Id. 
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city council approved an ordinance that would see parents of bullies 
fined up to $1000, unless they enrolled their child in an antibullying 
program.101 
The path to ordinances targeting bullying has been paved by 
other cities enacting more generalized parental liability statutes.102 In 
the 1990s, many states and municipalities began passing such 
ordinances.103 Many of these ordinances eliminated the parental-
intent requirement that was present in older parental liability laws, 
and imposed a strict-liability standard instead.104 
One of the first cities to start this trend was Silverton, Oregon. 
Silverton passed a law that charges parents with the misdemeanor 
 
 101. The Kansas City Ordinance states: 
It shall be unlawful for the parent, guardian or other person having custody or control 
of a minor to permit, or by insufficient control to allow, such minor to bully or cyber-
bully another minor. Upon conviction of a violation of this subsection, a parent, 
guardian or other person having custody or control of the minor shall be subject to a 
fine not to exceed $1,000.00 and costs. In lieu of a fine, the court may impose 
probation provided that a condition of probation is attendance in an available anti-
bullying program either provided by the school district wherein resides the convicted 
parent, guardian or other person having custody or control of the minor or provided 
by a group or entity approved by the court.  
KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 50-244 (2013). See Quinn, supra note 91. Kansas 
City has also implemented the crime-free housing program. See Crime Free Testimonials: Keep 
Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-
association.org/testimonials.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); infra text accompanying notes 119–
38. 
 102. Collins et al., supra note 15, at 1340. The authors note the fact that these laws are 
created at the local level means that they are “difficult to survey,” and “scholarly estimates” of 
their prevalence and scope are virtually nonexistent. Id. Nevertheless, this Article suggests that 
media reports and tools like Municode offer at least an overgeneralized picture of what is 
happening. 
 103. In 1996, a New York Times article noted the “proliferation of ‘dozens’ of ordinances in 
towns near Chicago in the ‘last two years.’” Id. at 1341 n.61 (quoting Peter Applebome, Parents 
Face Consequences as Children’s Misdeeds Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at A1). Parental 
responsibility laws parallel those in jurisdictions like “Central America, South America, and 
Europe,” where there is a “‘cultural emphasis on family solidarity,’” rather than “‘the high value 
the common law places on individualism.’” Dimitris, supra note 11, at 662. It appears that the 
public perception of an increase in juvenile crime in the 1990s was not based in fact: overall, 
juvenile crime actually declined by 30 percent from 1993 to 1998. Barton, supra note 11, at 879.  
 104. Portia Allen-Kyle, Note, Women at the Forefront: An Examination of the Disparate 
Exposure of Mothers to Liability Under Parental Responsibility Laws, EXPRESSO (2013), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/portia_allen-kyle. The older parental liability laws 
expanded the parental liability available at common law. Historically, in tort law, parents were 
generally “not liable for the acts of their child[ren].” Dimitris, supra note 11, at 662. There were 
four main exceptions to this general rule. Liability could attach if parents “directed or 
subsequently ratified the act[s]”; if the child “was acting as the parent’s agent or servant”; if the 
child was “entrusted with a dangerous instrumentality, such as a gun, or was negligently given 
access to an automobile”; or if “the parents’ negligence was a proximate cause of the harm.” Id. 
at 662, 663. 
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offense of “‘failing to supervise a minor’” whenever a child or youth 
violates a provision of the Silverton Municipal Code.105 The violations 
that trigger parental liability under the ordinance include acts as 
minor as cigarette smoking.106 The ordinance allows fines of parents 
even for a first offense of children up to the age of eighteen.107 
According to the mayor of Silverton, the law has been effective 
because “‘[w]hen their parents are being dragged into it, most kids . . . 
realize they’re not the only ones who pay the price for their actions, 
and kids begin to take stock of themselves.’”108 By the time the 
ordinance was a year old, “approximately a dozen parents had been 
charged” under it, Oregon state had passed a similar law, and 
Silverton city officials had received requests from “Europe, Japan, 
and Australia for copies of their ordinance.”109 
Using the Silverton ordinance as a template, a suburb in 
Cleveland, Ohio, passed a nearly identical ordinance.110 Prosecutors 
there could “criminally charge parents based on the misdeeds of their 
children” with “a third offense” potentially resulting in parents 
serving 180 days in jail.111 Recently, though, the ordinance was struck 
down on the grounds that it “was inconsistent with a state statute 
requiring the person charged to commit an act or omission as a 
predicate for culpability.”112 
Another community, St. Clair Shores, Michigan, enacted a 
similar law in 1994.113 According to the St. Clair Shores provision, 
parents can be held criminally responsible for failing to “‘reasonably 
control’” their children.114 The ordinance was drafted by two police 
 
 105. Parental Responsibility Laws, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.
ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_d.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (quoting SILVERTON, OR., 
ORDINANCE 95117 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 106. Tyler & Segady, supra note 11, at 86. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Collins et al., supra note 15, at 1340 (quotation marks omitted). 
 109. Tyler & Segady, supra note 11, at 87.  
 110. DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 67 (2009).  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Tami Scarola, Creating Problems Rather Than Solving Them: Why Criminal Parental 
Responsibility Laws Do Not Fit Within Our Understanding of Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1029, 1042 (1997). 
 114. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
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officers who were “motivated by juvenile crime increases,” and it 
passed “without debate.”115 
The proliferation of parental liability statutes is likely to 
continue. Numerous municipalities across America have already 
implemented parental liability ordinances, and many of those 
ordinances are “hybrid laws that both lower the mens rea required for 
the parent and define conduct by a minor that would not be 
separately subject to criminal sanction as evidence of ‘improper 
parenting.’”116 These laws are not based on culpable parental 
transgressions, like active participation or encouragement of the 
unlawful behavior. Rather, they set “liability for parents based solely 
on their status as a parent and the misconduct of their child alone.”117 
Cities nationwide often consider proposals to extend such liability, 
and local legislatures will almost certainly “continue to explore 
regulatory strategies” like this to “reduce juvenile misconduct” and 
address social problems like bullying.118 
2. Crime-Free Ordinances.  In addition to attracting a fine under 
a parental liability ordinance, a criminal or unlawful act committed by 
a child or any other household member could also potentially result 
in the child’s entire family’s eviction from rental housing under a 
mandated crime-free lease addendum. If her household lives in a 
municipality that has passed a crime-free ordinance mandating that 
landlord–tenant leases must contain a crime-free lease addendum, 
and the lease accordingly contains such an addendum, the household 
may be evicted for her unlawful act. The standard crime-free lease 
addendum requires the eviction of an entire tenant family when a 
tenant, family or household member, guest, or other person deemed 
to be under the tenant’s control, engages in criminal conduct on—and 
sometimes even off—the relevant premises.119 The following is an 
 
 115. Id.  
 116. Collins, supra note 15, at 1341. 
 117. Id. at 1342–43. The parents will then be able to “plead their good parenting skills as an 
affirmative defense rather than making the prosecution prove the absence of good parenting as 
part of its case-in-chief.” Id. at 1343. Indeed, it is unclear whether parents are actually being 
punished for the wrongful act of their children, or for their unwillingness to accept law 
enforcement interventions. See infra text accompanying notes 239–46. 
 118. Id. at 1342.  
 119. See, for example, West Palm Beach, Florida’s addendum. One Strike Policy, W. PALM 
BEACH HOUSING AUTH., http://www.wpbha.org/housing/one_strike_policy.html (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2015). 
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example of an expansive, yet relatively common, crime-free lease 
addendum: 
Resident, any member(s) of the resident’s household, a guest or any 
other person affiliated with the resident on or off the premises: 
Shall not engage in criminal activity, including drug-related criminal 
activity, on or off the said premises.120 
This type of addendum is part of the International Crime Free 
Association’s (ICFA’s) programs for rental or multi-unit housing.121 
The ICFA, a not-for-profit started in Arizona in 1992 by a former 
police officer, markets these programs to municipalities and provides 
support to those that implement them.122 Illinois, in particular, has 
championed this program, with over one hundred municipalities in 
the state having adopted these ordinances.123 To fight crime and 
disorder and promote the goal of security, approximately two 
thousand cities and towns in forty-four states have implemented the 
ICFA program.124 Proponents assert that the Crime-Free Program 
offers myriad benefits, including “reduced crime, better community 
awareness, increased property values, more attractive neighborhoods 
. . . and improved quality of life.”125 
 
 120. CLARK COUNTY ORDINANCE § 6.12.090 and CITY OF LAS VEGAS CODE § 6.09.020 
require all landlords of multihousing units to undergo training, and at the training session 
landlords are taught to use this addendum. Crime Free Multi-Housing, LAS VEGAS METRO. 
POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lvmpd.com/ProtectYourself/CrimeFreeMultiHousing/tabid/110/
default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
 121. Art Sharp, CPTED: Cleaning up the Complexes, 49 LAW & ORD. 117, 119 (2001). It is 
also widely used in Canada: cities in three Canadian provinces have implemented the program. 
For example, in Edmonton, Alberta, it governs over sixteen thousand families. Crime Free 
Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101. 
 122. Crime Free Programs, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association
.org/index.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
 123. EMILY WERTH & SARGENT SHRIVER, NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, THE COST OF 
BEING “CRIME FREE”: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FREE RENTAL 
HOUSING AND NUISANCE PROPERTY ORDINANCES 1 (2013). 
 124. Crime Free Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101. A 
smattering of these cities have provided positive testimonials on the Crime Free Program’s 
website, including Riverside, California; Kansas City, Missouri; Champlin, Minnesota; Monroe, 
Georgia; Columbia, Missouri; San Dimas, California; Lenexa, Kansas; St. Cloud, Minnesota; 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Henrico County, Virginia; El Cajon, California; Puyallup, Washington; 
Waite Park, Minnesota; and Fargo, North Dakota. Locales in other countries, including Canada, 
Mexico, England, and Finland, have also adopted the ordinances. See Crime Free Programs, 
supra note 122.  
 125. Crime Free Multi-Housing Program, CITY OF DUBLIN, CAL., http://www.ci.dublin.ca.us/
index.aspx?NID=118 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
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The Crime-Free Program involves several prongs, including 
training for property owners and managers, and attention to the 
physical aspects of security, like lighting and locks.126 The crime-free 
lease addendum, however, is the “cornerstone” of the program.127 The 
model addendum was originally created by the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, in the form of the one-strike 
policy applicable only to federal housing projects.128 The new 
municipal ordinances import this policy from the public housing 
context—where it was part of the artillery in the war against drugs—
into the private rental housing market at large.129 
The typical crime-free lease addendum has five notable features. 
First, in the private rental housing market, the addendum draws 
multiple third parties into the project of policing. The named tenant 
or the head of the household and the landlord are both conscripted 
into the project of crime control. The tenant is required to monitor 
and deter potentially unlawful behavior, and the landlord is required 
to evict tenants who fail to do so. Police or other city officials 
communicate their desire for eviction to the landlord, who must 
usually comply or face a series of escalating sanctions, including fines 
or the loss of a business license.130 
Second, the crime-free lease addendum holds tenants responsible 
for actions that they may be connected to only tangentially, by virtue 
of their familial or social relationship with another person. The 
addendum is based in strict vicarious liability, so although “the tenant 
herself may have had absolutely nothing to do with the alleged 
criminal conduct or drug activity, she is nevertheless subject to 
 
 126. Crime Free Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Sharp, supra note 121, at 119. For a discussion of the one-strike policy in the context of 
Section 8 housing, see Michael Zmora, Note, Between Rucker and a Hard Place: The Due 
Process Void for Section 8 Voucher Holders in No-Fault Evictions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1961 
(2009); Wendy J. Kaplan & David Rossman, Called ‘Out’ At Home: The One-Strike Eviction 
Policy and Juvenile Court, 109 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 109 (2011).   
 129. While crime-free lease addendums have not yet attracted much attention from legal 
scholars, there is a large body of literature focused on the one-strike policy. Because it formed 
the precedent for the crime-free lease addendum, and many of the issues surrounding them are 
similar, this Article uses the one-strike literature where appropriate. See Levy, supra note 12, at 
540. 
 130. Crime Free Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101. 
Typically, following some kind of arrest or police involvement, the city will send the landlord a 
letter, indicating that they must evict their tenants or face a series of sanctions, including fines 
and the revocation of the rental license. See, e.g., Javinsky-Wenzek v. City of St. Louis Park, 829 
F. Supp. 2d 787, 790 (D. Minn. 2011).  
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eviction for the conduct of the person who actually engaged in the 
prohibited activity.”131 Indeed, some ordinances “actually specify their 
intent to penalize the entire household for criminal activity regardless 
of whether members were aware of the activity or able to control the 
participants in the activity.”132 It is thought that such an addendum 
will offer “maximum incentives to tenants to prevent, discover, and 
remedy” the drug or criminal issues of household members.133 
Third, a crime-free lease addendum often encompasses a wide 
spectrum of behaviors, including not just criminal wrongs, but any 
sort of unlawful act, such as “local ordinance violations, the creation 
of a nuisance, and/or any conduct that endangers health, safety or 
welfare.”134 
Fourth, although some versions of these addendums limit the 
geographical scope to encompass only activities engaged in at the 
relevant premises, other versions, like the one set out in full above, 
extend to locations beyond the relevant rental property.135 
Fifth, and finally, these addendums do not generally require a 
criminal conviction of any kind. Instead, arrests and simple 
accusations of criminal or drug-related activity can trigger eviction.136 
This is particularly important when one remembers that order-
maintenance policing, which is currently the dominant mode of 
policing in America, targets misdemeanor and minor or noncriminal 
offenses. The vast majority of arrests currently made are not for 
serious crimes, but rather for minor infractions, and under the crime-
free program, these arrests are a valid basis for evicting a 
household.137 Some ordinances specifically state that arrests or 
 
 131. Robert Hornstein, Litigating Around the Long Shadow of Department of Housing and 
Urban Development v. Rucker: The Availability of Abuse of Discretion and Implied Duty of 
Good Faith Affirmative Defenses in Public Housing Criminal Activity Evictions, 43 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2011).  
 132. WERTH, supra note 123, at 12. 
 133. Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Brief for Respondent at 24, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (Nos. 00-1770, 00-1781), available at http://www.justice.gov/
osg/brief/hud-v-rucker-reply-merits. 
 134. WERTH, supra note 123, at 4. 
 135. Crime Free Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101. 
 136. Hornstein, supra note 131, at 275.  
 137. For example, in New York City in 1989, prior to the adoption of zero-tolerance 
policing, “there were approximately 86,000 non-felony arrests.” K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives 
from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 281, 291 (2009). In 1998, “when the policy was well-entrenched,” 
176,000 nonfelony arrests were made. Id. Further, arrests are a zone fraught with discretion, 
which unfortunately is often exercised in racially discriminatory ways. “[B]lack youths are 
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accusations of unlawful activity are sufficient grounds for eviction, 
whereas other ordinances have the slightly higher requirement that, 
at an eviction proceeding, criminal activity must be proven to the civil 
standard of a preponderance of the evidence.138 Eviction proceedings, 
however, do not often go all the way to a courtroom because most 
tenants do not fight their eviction notices.139 
3. Nuisance Ordinances.  Nuisance ordinances are often used in 
conjunction with crime-free lease addendums.140 They first became 
popular in the 1980s, mainly as a response to drug dealing.141 
Currently, many large U.S. cities rely on nuisance ordinances as part 
of their crime-control efforts.142 Under these ordinances, tenants will 
be evicted if the police are called to the property more than a 
threshold number of times, regardless of whether or not the tenant 
had any participation in the nuisance activity that prompted the calls. 
Those who pass nuisance ordinances believe that they have many 
“important long-term benefits,” including providing safer and more 
 
arrested at a disproportionately higher rate than whites,” and the discriminatory treatment at 
the arrest stage is merely the first stop on a two-path system, exacerbated by eviction policies. 
“When the children of affluent people are caught using drugs, they’re apt to end up in treatment 
programs; the children of poor people are more likely to end up in jail, while their parents may 
end up on the streets.” Renai S. Rodney, Am I My Mother’s Keeper? The Case Against the Use 
of Juvenile Arrest Records in One-Strike Public Housing Evictions, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 739, 763 
(2004). As one example of race and arrest numbers, in New York City in 2000–2005, “about 
86% of people arrested for misdemeanors . . . were nonwhite.” Howell, supra note 137, at 281, 
291.  
 138. WERTH, supra note 123, at 4.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120. In 1987, Portland, Oregon, was among the 
first cities to pass a nuisance-abatement ordinance to address drug dealing. MARTHA J. SMITH & 
LORRAINE MAZEROLLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST PROPERTY 
TO CONTROL CRIME PROBLEMS 14 (2013). Many states followed suit, and  
by 1992, 24 U.S. states had passed statutes specifically designed to control drug 
activities on private properties. A number of these were based on old ‘bawdy house’ 
laws designed to curb prostitution. Abatement and eviction notices have been used 
hand-in-hand to address drug crimes in housing. Abatement actions focus on the 
property holder while eviction actions focus on the leaseholder or renter, but 
sometimes it is necessary to provide notice of potential abatement actions to induce 
the owner to act against the tenant. 
 Id. (footnotes omitted). Of course, nuisance as a civil cause of action has a much longer history. 
 142. For example, in 2007, to combat gang activity, Los Angeles County “began using 
nuisance abatement lawsuits against both the property owners and the specific gang members 
who allowed or created a nuisance at a particular property,” and Seattle, Washington, passed a 
“chronic nuisance property ordinance” in 2009. Id. In Los Angeles County, a chronic-nuisance 
property is “one where certain crimes, drug-related activities, or gang-related activities occur 
three times within a 60-day period or seven times within a 12-month period.” Id. at 16. 
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appealing communities, increasing property values, and having a 
general “good effect on quality of life.”143 
A survey combining the nuisance ordinances of the twenty 
largest U.S. cities with an additional thirty-nine ordinances in cities 
that varied in location and population revealed that most nuisance 
ordinances are “strikingly similar.”144 They have three main features.145 
First, the nuisance designation is “based on excessive service calls [i.e. 
calls to police] made within a certain timeframe.”146 Second, a large 
and loosely defined set of activities can constitute a nuisance.147 For 
instance, one city defines nuisance conduct as 
any activity, conduct, or condition occurring upon private property 
within the city that unreasonably annoys, injures or endangers the 
safety, health, morals, comfort or repose of any member of the 
public; or will, or tend to, alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke 
breach of the peace, to which the city is required to respond.148 
 Finally, like the crime-free lease addendums, nuisance 
ordinances demand that landlords perform third-party policing 
functions and “coerce property owners to ‘abate the nuisance’ or face 
fines, property forfeiture, or even incarceration.”149 
As with the crime-free lease addendum, nuisance ordinances 
coerce both landlords and tenants into performing third-party 
policing. In many cases, the tenant is not the person who actually 
causes the nuisance, yet the tenant is the person who will face the 
legal consequence of the nuisance behavior. One troubling 
manifestation of this aspect of nuisance ordinances occurs in the 
context of domestic violence. Female tenants, who have either 
themselves contacted police or whose neighbors, family members, or 
friends did so, have been evicted for violating nuisance ordinances in 
 
 143. Municipal Nuisances: South Dakota Municipal League Guide to Public Nuisance 
Enforcement and Abatement, S.D. MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, available at http://sd.govoffice.com/
vertical/sites/%7B2540dc39-a742-459f-8caf-7839ecf21e89%7D/uploads/%7B46e3eb3f-0a31-
4411-ade5-83640bfec0d4%7D.pdf. 
 144. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Online Supplement to Unpolicing the Urban Poor: 
Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women 2 (2013), http://scholar.
harvard.edu/files/mdesmond/files/unpolicing.asr2013.online.supplement_0.pdf.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. Often, three or four calls a year related to drug activity will be enough to trigger the 
provisions. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. ROBBINSDALE, MINN., CODE § 927.03 (2013). 
 149. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120.  
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connection with their attempts to seek assistance during home 
violence.150 
II.  RISK MANAGEMENT AND CRIME PREVENTION AT HOME 
This Part explains how home rule ordinances configure the home 
as a site of risk management, crime prevention, and security 
production. Although homes are usually understood as private 
spaces, in reality, as Part II.A describes, the state makes numerous 
interventions into the home, and home rule ordinances are one more 
such incursion. Home rule ordinances configure the home as a site of 
security production: a place where criminality must be prevented and 
the goals of security advanced. Part II.B sets out the means that home 
rule ordinances use to accomplish these goals. Home rule ordinances 
compel a set of behaviors that the state believes are “necessary and 
desirable for the management of social order and stability.”151 These 
behaviors include acts of surveillance, monitoring, and isolation. This 
Part discusses how engaging in these compelled behaviors strains 
social and familial relations, impacts zones of intimacy and trust, and 
entails a psychic cost upon the person forced to embody the state in 
this way. Although the sanctions that accompany the home rule 
ordinances are themselves deeply problematic, the compelled acts 
that are required to successfully perform third-party policing in the 
home are perhaps even more worthy of concern.152 
A. The Dominant Legal and Cultural Constructions of Home 
Homes are generally thought of as private spaces, where one can 
interact with the members of one’s family and intimate circle as one 
pleases, and where, absent domestic abuse or other harms to 
household members, state intervention is usually unwarranted.153 As 
Professor Jeannie Suk explains: 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Mele, supra note 11, at 135. 
 152. Id. 
 153. SUK, supra note 82, at 1; Martha Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (1999). It should be noted, as Professor Martha Fineman does, that  
[s]omewhat of a dilemma is presented for those of us who view ‘privacy’ as essential 
to the concept of family while simultaneously conceding the more modern notion that 
privacy can conceal, even foster, situations dangerous to the individuals who comprise 
the family unit. The focus on the necessity of privacy for family formation and 
functioning arises from concern with abuses associated with state intervention and 
regulation of intimacy. By contrast, those who are attuned to potential abuses within 
the family remind us that hidden beneath the cloak of privacy are power imbalances, 
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Few concepts are as ubiquitous in ordinary human experience as the 
home. For most people, the home has formative cultural, emotional, 
and psychic significance. “Home,” as distinct from household or the 
physical structure of the house, emerged in the nineteenth century 
as a bourgeois ideal of domesticity and privacy, closely associated 
with the affective private life of the family. This still evolving 
concept deeply informs our sense of who we are, and our feelings of 
safety and belonging.154 
The home also represents “the metaphorical boundary between 
private and public spheres,” and serves as a nodal site where “the 
most basic questions about the relation between individuals and state 
power arise.”155 The idea of the privacy or “sanctity” of the home is 
recognized and protected in much constitutional jurisprudence, 
particularly in Fourth Amendment cases.156 In that context, the 
Supreme Court has specified that homes are to be protected from 
excessive government oversight and that the State is not to be 
“omnipresent in the home.”157 In this construction, respect for the 
home as a special space has been “embedded in our traditions since 
the origins of the Republic,” and absent compelling reasons, state 
intervention should be minimal.158 
Yet, despite this rhetoric, the home is subject to government and 
institutional interventions on many fronts.159 Most of these 
interventions are justified on the basis that they prevent or redress 
 
perhaps even incentives for the strong to prey upon or exploit the weak. When we 
consult the empirical information, it seems both perspectives are warranted.  
Id. 
 154. Id. at 1–2.  
 155. Id. at 3.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. REV. 311, 326 (2013) 
(quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003)). The privacy of the home has also been 
critiqued as serving as a “mask for male oppression within families” and a cloak for “the 
violence against women and children” that occurs in that setting. “But the private sphere 
ideology, with all its faults, nonetheless also established as a concept the desirability of a space 
into which the state, absent compelling reasons, was not free to intrude.” Martha Albertson 
Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 
968 (1991). Privacy torts, too, support the home as a setting of “spatial intimacy,” deserving of 
significant legal protections. Anderson, supra, at 318.  
 158. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980). The laws governing the harboring of 
fugitives also suggest the special status of homes and families. Fourteen states exempt family 
members from prosecution for this wrongful act. An additional four states offer reduced liability 
to family members for this offense. Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal 
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1160 (2007). 
 159. Fineman, supra note 153, at 1207.  
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harms to others, both inside and outside of the home. For instance, 
the state now intervenes to protect family members and intimate 
partners from abuse and mistreatment. Additionally, institutions like 
school and work have increasing authority over occurrences in the 
home that may harm others outside of it. To use an example from the 
bullying context, what a child does at home can now attract 
disciplinary action from the school.160 As long as a home-based 
activity has some impact on school life, it can subject students to 
school discipline.161 Similarly, home-based activities that affect the 
workplace can fall under the umbrella of activities that may subject 
an employee to workplace discipline.162 
Of course, some homes have always been subject to more state 
intervention than others.163 The privilege of privacy has often had less 
political potency when applied to housing that has a “public” 
dimension, like federal housing projects or Section 8 subsidized 
housing.164 The one-strike policy in federal housing is a good example 
of homes being understood as open to public scrutiny and control. 
Initially, the burden of deterring the criminality of others was placed 
only on those with homes in federal housing projects, which are thus 
somehow “public.” “For those deemed eligible to live in public 
housing,” the ability to remain in residence there depended “upon 
[their] adherence to stricter rules and regulations” than those applied 
to more “private” homes.165 
Now, crime-free lease ordinances have brought the one-strike 
policy into the private housing realm, and they, along with parental 
liability and nuisance ordinances, ensure that more households than 
ever are responsible for producing security through deterring crime. 
To deter others, parents and heads of household are expected to 
perform behaviors involving surveillance, monitoring, and exclusion 
in cooperation with state recommendations and programs. In these 
 
 160. Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1669, 1698 n.142, 1702 n.163 (2012). 
 161. Id.  
 162. For a discussion of this issue, see Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. 
REV. 655, 672 n.83 (2012). 
 163. To be sure, state intervention into the home has not meant the same thing historically 
across race and class.  
 164. Austin, supra note 11, at 273–75.  
 165. Mele, supra note 11, at 136. Those rules were “legitimated by larger political discourses 
on welfarism, the worthy poor, and drugs and crime.” Id.  
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ways, the state is able to intervene inside the home in a rather 
insidious way: through one’s friends and family members. 
B. Compelled Compliance Behaviors 
To avoid legal sanction, home rule ordinances require parents 
and heads of household to perform a set of conforming behaviors. 
These individuals must don the role of “guarantor” or “insurer” of 
other people’s actions and assume an “affirmative obligation” to 
“monitor and control their own and others’ choices of associations 
and relationships.”166 Tenants must “scrutinize the behaviors of family 
members, their friends, and visitors within the home and outside of 
it,” and ward off the possibility that one of them will engage in 
unlawful conduct.167 Surveillance, monitoring, and isolation are the 
techniques meant to be employed in this pursuit. 
1. Surveillance and Monitoring.  Surveillance and monitoring are 
a part of modern life. Gradually, increased surveillance, at least in the 
public sphere, has become normalized: “[E]ach new surveillance or 
discipline technique normalizes a certain amount of state intrusion 
and paves the way for the next program that goes a step 
further. . . . Step-by-step, panic-by-panic, we have weakened the 
boundaries that have protected a private sphere.”168 Despite this kind 
of “surveillance creep,” the home, as a traditionally private sphere, 
has been relatively buffered from the monitoring going on in the 
outside world. Home rule ordinances, however, require the 
performance of surveillance and monitoring activities. Through these 
ordinances, cities have “slipped control, surveillance, and regulation 
into ordinary everyday behaviors.”169 
One example of “surveillance creep” within the home comes in 
the context of cyberbullying. To prevent children from being involved 
with cyberbullying, parents are advised to engage in a series of 
monitoring activities including using a cellular-phone service plan that 
grants parents significant control over the child’s phone activities, 
adjusting parental control settings on the Internet, and limiting 
 
 166. Id. at 135 (quotation marks omitted).  
 167. Id. at 122. 
 168. Ahrens, supra note 160, at 1704. Ahrens’s reference is to “a private sphere for public 
school students.” Id.  
 169. Mele, supra note 11, at 122.  
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computer use.170 These kinds of activities, performed at the behest of 
the state rather than because the parent believes it to be the best 
course of action for their particular child, encourage “parents to 
abandon their traditional role of protecting their children and join in 
partnership with the state in becoming risk managers.”171 The overall 
message to parents is that “the repression of criminal conduct must 
take priority over any other objectives of child rearing and that 
parents will be expected to accomplish this largely on their own or 
with what they can purchase.”172 
Performing surveillance activities often comes at a significant 
cost, not only in terms of personal resources, but also in terms of 
stress on relationships. It “is not conducive to familial relations to 
have loved ones forced to play vigilante with one another, constantly 
in a state of suspicion.”173 At the same time as parents are advised that 
they should implement the monitoring techniques listed above, they 
are also warned that they must nevertheless “be mindful that 
communication is a key aspect of social development and that 
constant surveillance of their child’s Internet use may damage parent-
child trust.”174 The kinds of negative impacts that accompany 
monitoring and surveillance help explain, for example, why a parent 
may wish to have a school perform drug searches on her children 
rather than performing them herself: 
[B]y having schools search their children, parents are permitted to 
maintain a better relationship with their children than they might 
have otherwise and are spared the effort of personally conducting 
the search. Parents do not have to confront their children or risk 
damage to parent/child trust by requesting their children subject 
themselves to potentially invasive or humiliating searches. If drug 
testing is the price for participating in school activities and allowing 
your principal access to your photos is the price for bringing a cell 
 
 170. Kevin Turbert, Note, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to 
Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651, 689 (2009). 
 171. Tammy Thurman, Parental Responsibility Laws/Are They the Answer to Juvenile 
Delinquency?, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 99, 106 (2003).  
 172. SIMON, supra note 49, at 202.  
 173. Timothy E. Heinle, Comment, Guilty by Association: What the Decision in Boston 
Housing Authority v. Garcia Means for the Innocent Family Members of Criminals Living in 
Public Housing in Massachusetts, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213, 232 
(2009). 
 174. Turbert, supra note 170, at 689–90.  
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phone to school, then parents plausibly can shift the blame onto 
schools for policing techniques that are sure to enrage teenagers.175 
Regardless of whether searches also occur in places outside the 
home, some courts have agreed with the state’s view that parents or 
tenants should conduct home searches for drugs or other 
contraband.176 For instance, in the Supreme Court decision that 
upheld the one-strike policy, Department of Housing & Urban 
Development v. Rucker,177 it was noted in her favor that Pearlie 
Rucker, a sixty-three year old grandmother subject to eviction from a 
public housing project after her daughter was caught with cocaine a 
few blocks from the premises, had regularly searched her daughter’s 
room.178 These efforts may have factored into the housing authority’s 
ultimate decision not to pursue Ms. Rucker’s eviction.179 
At least one court, though, has concluded that asking tenants to 
search their guests and family members is not an acceptable 
requirement.180 In addressing a case in which a tenant was evicted 
based on a guest’s possession of a small amount of drugs, the Ohio 
Municipal Court held that eviction under these circumstances was 
tantamount to holding that tenants could simply have no guests, or 
“equally implausibl[y]” that tenants “must conduct a thorough search 
of each guest” every time he or she visited.181 Although this judge 
believed that tenants should not have to search their guests or socially 
isolate themselves to avoid eviction, other courts have held that 
guests in possession of small amounts of drugs are a valid basis for 
eviction.182 Thus, heads of household concerned about facing eviction 
may indeed feel the need to bar guests or search the guests that they 
do invite to their homes. 
2. Isolation.  Home rule ordinances have isolating effects on 
kinship and relationship formation. An example from a sociologist’s 
 
 175. Ahrens, supra note 160, at 1714–15 (footnotes omitted). 
 176. See, e.g., Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Kilgore, 958 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2011) (holding a tenant strictly liable for the drug offenses of her guests under Rucker).  
 177. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
 178. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Harris, 861 N.E.2d 179, 181 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 2006). 
 181. Id.  
 182. See, e.g., Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Kilgore, 958 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2011).  
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study of the mobilization of resident organizations in federal public 
housing dramatically demonstrates these isolating effects. Describing 
a public housing project in southeastern North Carolina, the 
sociologist recounts how just outside the projects, “a small number of 
African-American men would routinely assemble each morning at a 
street corner to wait for their girlfriends or wives, who were residents 
of a nearby housing project, to leave their apartments and cross the 
street to visit them.”183 It turned out that the men “who had been 
accused, arrested, or convicted of various criminal infractions, were 
barred from stepping foot on the project.”184 For their female 
companions, “the cost of permitting them to visit or stay the night was 
possible eviction” under the one-strike policy.185 
For these couples, the one-strike policy altered the terms of their 
relationships.186 The female tenant was allowed to keep her home only 
if she agreed to banish her partner from the premises.187 For some 
tenants, then, social and familial isolation is the price of maintaining 
their homes. The difficulty of sustaining a relationship under these 
conditions is obvious.188 
Children are also often banned from the premises as a solution to 
potential eviction in federal-housing situations.189 Indeed, when a 
child’s behavior is the trigger for eviction, “the matter is most often 
settled with an agreement that the child will no longer live in the 
 
 183. Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller, Introduction, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 11, at 2. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. For another example of how law can directly impact intimate relationships, see King 
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968).  
 186. This is similar to the situation Professor Jeannie Suk describes in relation to protective 
orders and domestic law. Suk, supra note 81, at 14.  
 187. Domestic-violence law also encourages partner separation. See id. at 53.  
 188. This is particularly interesting in light of recent studies focused on the connections 
between marriage, class, and race. See CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF 
WHITE AMERICA, 1960–2010, at 11–13 (2013); RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR 
WHITE PEOPLE? 1–4 (2011). Moreover, “families headed by single mothers, and especially 
black single mothers,” have “been blamed for a myriad of social problems, including 
unemployment, poor health, school drop-out rates and an increase in juvenile crime.” Twila L. 
Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 345 
(1996). Often ignored in these discussions is how such policies exert fracturing pressures on the 
development of intimate relationships. 
 189. Austin notes that “[j]ust as in slave times when commercial transactions separated 
mothers from their children, here too ‘kinship’ loses meaning since it is subject to termination in 
the name of property relations.” Austin, supra note 11, at 286.  
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unit.”190 “Agreement” may be a strong word in this context, given that 
the situation reads like “a classic Catch 22. Either the family agrees to 
dispossess one of its children, or stays together and finds itself out on 
the street.”191 Such banning procedures have obvious social 
consequences like “divided families, the surveillance of intimacy,” 
and “the stigma of past behavior.”192 
To avoid the risk that a loved one may engage in wrongful 
behavior, tenants trying to avoid the operation of crime-free lease 
addendums may similarly alter the terms of their relationships with 
others. When eviction is based not on a tenant’s level of fault, but on 
“the relationship established between the leaseholder and covered 
person,” the tenant is left to decide whether the relationship is worth 
risking her home.193 Indeed, in the context of public housing, officials 
have explicitly stated that they want tenants to choose their housing 
over their families. One city mayor bluntly asserted that, “‘[w]e want 
tenants to understand that if they don’t control members of their 
families, they are going to lose their housing.’”194 A housing authority 
director offered a further clarification of this sentiment: “‘The head of 
household is responsible for family members . . . . The message is, 
don’t risk your house; let them [family members] fend for 
themselves.’”195 The lines are clearly drawn: a tenant must choose 
between allegiance to the state, which will require alienating a loved 
one, or allegiance to her family, which may require her eviction.196 
 
 190. Kaplan & Rossman, supra note 128, at 109, 119–20. And “forty-four percent of all One 
Strike cases that are not cancelled or dismissed end in an agreement that the offending member 
of the household, often a child or grandchild, will be banished from the family home.” Id. at 120 
n.70. The experience of Gloria Franklin and her son serves as one example. Seventeen-year-old 
Tyran Pratt was arrested “allegedly with $10 worth of marijuana” outside of his mother’s home. 
Although the charge against him was dismissed, the housing authority required his mother to 
ban him from the premises or otherwise face eviction. As a newspaper article describes,  
Franklin got choked up recalling the moment she told her son. It was one of the most 
difficult points in her life, she said. “I gave him a hug, shared a few tears, and I just 
told him, ‘You have to go; I’m sorry,’” Franklin added. Since Pratt left last summer, 
Franklin says she hasn’t seen him much. He dropped out of school and has been living 
on the streets. Sometimes he’ll call when he’s hungry, and she’ll bring him food. And 
other times she sees him sleeping in a playground near her house, a sight she 
describes as “one of the most hurtful things.”  
Dylan Cinti, Dismantling Families, CHI. REP., Sept. 1, 2011, at 17.   
 191. Kaplan & Rossman, supra note 128, at 120. 
 192. Mele, supra note 11, at 2.  
 193. Id. at 128.  
 194. Weil, supra note 11, at 171 (quotation marks omitted).  
 195. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 196. For more on this kind of conflict between obligations to the family and obligations to 
the state, see MARKEL ET AL., supra note 110, at 6–8. 
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For tenants who do not feel that they have the ability to closely 
monitor or deter family members from wrongdoing, banishing these 
individuals and isolating their households may be the only viable 
option. These tenants may feel “overbearing pressure” to “close their 
households” as a means of safeguarding their homes against potential 
eviction.197 This is particularly true because of the no-fault basis for 
evictions: even if the tenant makes a best-efforts attempt to deter 
family members, if those attempts are unsuccessful, eviction will 
follow. So, “[f]or instance, where a parent or grand-parent has no 
realistic means of controlling the conduct of their adolescent children 
or grandchildren at all times and at all places, the only way for the 
tenant to minimize the risk of eviction . . . is to exclude their children 
or grandchildren from the apartment altogether.”198 Such exclusion 
comes at a profound social and psychic cost. Through home rule 
ordinances, the state decides for whom families can care, and how 
they can care for them. 
Another important type of isolation that home rule ordinances 
create occurs in the context of nuisance citations based in domestic 
violence. Nuisance ordinances discourage tenants experiencing 
domestic violence from calling the police because such calls lead to 
nuisance citations, and nuisance citations lead to eviction.199 Many 
not-for-profit groups providing assistance to women suffering 
domestic abuse note that clients regularly state that they are not 
calling police for assistance, even when they desperately need it, 
because they fear eviction.200 In other words, these nuisance 
 
 197. Brief for Respondents, supra note 133, at 92, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 
535 U.S. 125 (2002) (No. 00-1770). 
 198. Id. These ordinances may also dissuade tenants from letting recently paroled family 
members or intimate partners live with them. They may fear that the paroled person “will get 
back in trouble,” and cost them their housing. This is an additional negative impact on an 
already difficult reintegration process. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of Parole: 
Rethinking the Role of the State in Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 421, 426 (2011). 
 199. Erik Eckholm, Victims’ Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring Eviction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 
2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/us/victims-dilemma-911-calls-can-
bring-eviction.html. 
 200. According to one grassroots domestic-violence group in a small metropolitan area, two 
families accessed their emergency shelter in one month “to avoid calling police for fear of 
evictions.” Statement of Interest: Alle-Kiski Area HOPE Center, Inc., Briggs v. Borough of 
Norristown (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2013) (No. 2:13-cv-2191), available at https://www.aclu
.org/files/assets/2013_05_31_appendix_a_-_amici_statements_of_interest.pdf. Further, there is a 
history of police ignoring women’s requests for assistance with domestic violence. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, police ignored “the pleas of women seeking assistance simply because their assailants 
were their husbands.” LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 106 (2012). In Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. 
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ordinances encourage battered women to isolate themselves from 
society and from “the ‘protective arm’ of the state.”201 This was 
illustrated in a case that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
initiated on behalf of Lakisha Briggs, after the fear of eviction 
prevented her from calling police during a nearly lethal attack by her 
former boyfriend.202 The attack required her to be airlifted to a 
hospital for emergency treatment, and she survived only because a 
neighbor called the police.203 She did indeed face eviction proceedings 
upon her return from hospital.204 
III.  THE ROLE OF STRICT VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Even if one does engage in the acts of surveillance, monitoring, 
and isolation that the home rule ordinances require, those efforts may 
not be successful. This Part sets out how the strict vicarious liability 
standard of the home rule ordinances allows for the imposition of 
legal sanction, regardless of fault. Part III.A describes how the home 
rule ordinances are “no-fault” laws, meaning that, as a policy matter, 
they apply in the absence of what we normally consider to be morally 
culpable behavior. The unlawful act of a household member, friend, 
or guest, plus a relationship between that person and the parents or 
tenants, is enough to trigger the sanction associated with the 
 
Conn. 1984), a plaintiff was awarded $2.3 million after police stood by while her husband 
“dropped the knife that dripped with his wife’s blood,” kicked her “repeatedly in the head,” and 
tried to attack her again “while she was lying on a stretcher, waiting for medical treatment.” 
GOODMARK, supra, at 106. 
 201. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 138. 
 202. Lakisha Briggs rented under the Section 8 voucher program. Ninety percent of Section 
8 households are female-headed, and 30 percent of those women are disabled; 84 percent of 
Section 8 households have children, with children making up 55 percent of all people assisted by 
Section 8. Phil Steinhaus, Those Aided by Section 8 Not Criminals, COLUM. TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2009), 
http://archive.columbiatribune.com/2009/Jan/20090104Comm008.asp.  
 203. One of the grounds of the lawsuit is that it violates the right to petition. Calling 911 is a 
citizen’s “primary source of communication with the police.” Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42; 
see also Tamara L. Kuennen, Recognizing the Right to Petition for Victims of Domestic Violence, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 837 (2012) (arguing that the police practice of calling Child 
Protective Services when a mother experiences domestic violence violates her First Amendment 
right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”). 
 204. Eckholm, supra note 199. Similarly, a landlord initiated eviction proceedings against 
Veronica Maffeo in Boston, Massachusetts, on the basis that “she caused a disturbance when 
she screamed for help” during a domestic assault perpetrated by her ex-boyfriend. Brief of 
Amici Curiae of the National Network to End Domestic Violence at 3, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (No. 00-1770), 2001 WL 1663790 (citing Def’s Mot. To 
Vacate J., New Trial, Weston Assoc. v. Veronica Maffeo at ¶ 4 (Hous. Ct. Dep’t, Boston Div., 
filed Sept. 2001) (Docket No. 01-SP-03935)).  
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ordinance. This reality sits uncomfortably with our usual commitment 
to punishment on the basis of individual culpability. Perhaps because 
of this discomfort, extralegal narratives of fault have sprung up 
around these ordinances. Those who advocate for and enforce these 
provisions have constructed narratives of fault to rationalize the 
imposition of legal sanctions in these circumstances. 
In many important ways, vicarious liability in this context ends 
up conflating vulnerability with fault. Part III.B outlines how home 
rule ordinances essentially penalize parents and tenants for lacking 
the ability to control the behavior of others, even though it is 
arguably very difficult for anyone to truly control the behavior of 
another. Moreover, home rule ordinances tend to have the most 
impact upon members of vulnerable groups, such as minorities, the 
poor, and female-headed households, creating problematic 
connections between vulnerability, fault, and the inability to control 
others. 
Further, as Part III.C discusses, the vicarious liability nature of 
the home rule ordinances has an additional consequence: a profound 
framing effect that assigns blame to both the wrongdoer and his or 
her social and familial relations. Left outside of this frame are larger, 
structural factors that are heavily correlated with crime and drug 
abuse, such as poverty, economic inequality, and lack of opportunity. 
A. Individual Culpability and Narratives of Fault 
The idea of “individual culpability for wrongdoing” is a 
foundational principle of the American legal system.205 As one judge 
phrased it, “Our demand that responsibility be personal” is a 
communal value, “the result of the ‘inarticulate, subconscious sense 
of justice of the [person] on the street.’”206 Strict vicarious liability, in 
which a person is liable for another’s actions even though he or she 
has not personally engaged in any wrongdoing, seems to fly in the 
 
 205. James Massey, Susan L. Miller & Anna Wilhelmi, Civil Forfeiture of Property: The 
Victimization of Women as Innocent Owners and Third Parties, in SUSAN L. MILLER, CRIME 
CONTROL AND WOMEN: FEMINIST IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 15, 15 (Susan 
L. Miller ed., 1998). 
 206. City of Maple Heights v. Ephraim, 898 N.E.2d 974, 982 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of 
Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 103 (1985)) 
(technically speaking about criminal vicarious liability). Though, given the blurring of criminal 
and civil lines here, the comments are applicable to these scenarios as well. 
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face of that.207 It is an “exception to the usual rule that each person is 
accountable for his own legal fault, but in the absence of such fault, is 
not responsible for the actions of others.”208 Nevertheless, in a variety 
of contexts, we do allow strict or vicarious liability to exist without 
experiencing too much existential angst.209 Strict liability is a fairly 
common feature of contract and tort law, and its manifestations in the 
form of “vicarious, corporate, and joint and several liability” are not 
regarded as particularly controversial.210 For example, the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, which holds employers vicariously liable for the 
acts of their employees, is a well-accepted application of strict 
liability.211 Vicarious liability is currently understood mainly as a 
policy device to transfer risk to the person who profits from it, is best 
able to avoid it, and can best financially manage it.212 
Vicarious liability most often concerns business relationships, 
like “employer-employee, corporation-manager, buyer-seller, 
producer-consumer, and service provider-recipient.”213 But the idea of 
strict vicarious liability is no stranger to the domestic or family 
context.214 Rather, “the tendency to include secondary social others as 
responsible for the crime, deviance, and the sins of family members, 
friends and significant others is well-established in the human 
experience,”215 and “[f]amilial responsibility has been a consistent 
 
 207. Technically, strict liability and vicarious liability are not the same concept, but much of 
the literature on parental liability and the one-strike policy uses these terms interchangeably. 
Strict liability is “a concept associated principally with the law of torts” and “is popularly 
understood to mean liability without fault.” Hornstein, supra note 131, at 263. Vicarious 
liability, on the other hand, exists when the conduct of a third party is imputed to the defendant. 
Vicarious liability is “a form of strict liability.” Id. at 264.  
 208. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 333 (2000). 
 209. Levinson, supra note 69, at 361. 
 210. Id. at 421. Vicarious liability is deeply tied to the notion of agency. It can also apply 
when one has entrusted another with her property. For example, in Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 
U.S. 465 (1926), the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of a vehicle used to illegally transport 
liquor by someone to whom the owner had entrusted the vehicle. SAMAHA, supra note 9, at 229.  
 211. Interestingly, the philosopher and jurist Jeremy Bentham linked this doctrine to the 
concept of policing. He used the metaphor of policing to describe how respondeat superior 
operated to ensure that that the master would act as an “inspector of police, a domestic 
magistrate” for a servant’s torts. Kraakman, supra note 28, at 53 n.1. It should also be noted that 
this kind of liability originated in the household. Levinson, supra note 69, at 354 n.34. 
 212. See PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
90 (2010).  
 213. SAMAHA, supra note 9, at 208.  
 214. Indeed, state statutes and ordinances in which parents are held vicariously liable for 
their children’s wrongful actions are now relatively common. Id. at 230.  
 215. Massey et al., supra note 205, at 15. 
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theme in legal and social sanctioning regimes since ancient times.”216 
Historically, many cultures have viewed clans and families, not 
individuals, as their primary “jural unit” or “relevant unit of moral 
agency and blame,” and group responsibility has functioned as the 
dominant legal norm.217 
Modern thought has, however, replaced the ancient notion that 
the “sins of the father will be visited upon the children”218 with a focus 
on individual rights and responsibilities. Now, the idea of “individual 
culpability for wrongdoing, especially in the case of criminal 
behavior . . . forms the very foundation for the administration of 
justice in Western societies.”219 In general, we, as a society, have the 
sense that although a person can sometimes be justly held responsible 
for contributing to another person’s wrongdoing, we are deeply 
troubled by concerns of “‘punishing the innocent,’ imposing ‘guilt by 
association,’ or ‘failing to treat people as individuals.’”220 
Now, when strict liability is brought into the home, it affronts our 
modern sense that only individuals who are themselves culpable 
should be held legally liable. For instance, the crime-free lease 
addendums would allow “eviction of an entire family if a tenant’s 
child was visiting friends on the other side of the country and was 
caught smoking marijuana, even if the parents had no idea the child 
had ever engaged in such activity and even if they had no realistic way 
to control their child’s actions 3,000 miles away.”221 The “principle of 
house-hold wide responsibility” for such a wrong can strike the 
modern conscience as profoundly unfair, as can the eviction of a 
family making best efforts to care for its members and avoid 
 
 216. Levinson, supra note 69, at 411. 
 217. MARK S. WEINER, THE RULE OF THE CLAN: WHAT AN ANCIENT FORM OF SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION REVEALS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 1, 3 (2013); 
Levinson, supra note 69, at 348. 
 218. This phrase, and its variations, appears in many Western canonical texts, including the 
Bible, Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, and Euripides. See, e.g., EURIPIDES, FRAGMENTS 
563, Frag. 980 (Christopher Collard & Martin Cropp eds. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2008).  
 219. Massey et al., supra note 205, at 15.  
 220. Levinson, supra note 69, at 348. 
 221. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). Most of the one-strike cases are about drug possession: one 
study of the one-strike policy cases in Chicago found that over 70 percent of cases involved drug 
possession, and less than 10 percent involved drug dealing. Angela Caputo, One and Done, CHI. 
REP. (Sept. 1, 2011), http://chicagoreporter.com/one-and-done. In 2010, 76 percent of arrests 
leading to eviction were for misdemeanors. Id. 
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criminality, such as when a family member is on a waitlist for a drug-
treatment program.222 
Courts and other judicial actors have often indicated difficulties 
with accepting as legitimate the strict-liability nature of home rule 
ordinances. For instance, in one case, a jury held that eviction of a 
mother and her children, ranging in age from sixteen to twenty-five, 
was unwarranted, despite facts stipulating to the son’s drug use.223 
Also, a judge in the public housing context expressly noted that 
although she felt bound by the decision in Rucker, she had great 
difficulty trying to “reconcile fundamental principles of fairness and 
due process with a finding that wholly innocent persons can be 
punished for the criminal activity of others of which they had no 
knowledge and over which they had no control.”224 
Many courts have expressed similar concerns when presented 
with situations in which vicarious liability results in criminal 
sanctions.225 Some courts have found that in minor misdemeanor 
cases, when the punishment at issue is only a “slight fine and not 
imprisonment,” vicarious criminal liability does not violate due 
process, but other courts have held that this does violate due process, 
and that the consequences of a criminal conviction “cannot rest on so 
frail a reed” as whether someone else will “commit a mistake in 
judgment.”226 Nevertheless, when vicarious liability is upheld, it is 
often justified by the deterrent effect it is supposed to have on both 
the wrongdoer and the person ultimately held responsible.227 
At its worst, vicarious liability seems to involve “the sacrifice of 
innocent individuals on the altar of some allegedly worthy social 
purpose.”228 It conflicts with the deeply held belief that unless a 
person “has done something to deserve and warrant punishment, the 
state lacks moral and political authority to move against him, at least 
in a democratic state committed to liberal values of individual liberty 
 
 222. The phrase “principle of household-wide responsibility” was used in the Reply Brief 
for the Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Rucker case. Weil, supra note 
11, at 177. 
 223. The court issued a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Jamie’s Place I LLC v. Reyes, 
No. L&T252658/08, 2009 WL 4282852 (Table), at *4 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Oct. 22, 2009). 
 224. Hous. Auth. of Joliet v. Chapman, 780 N.E.2d 1106, 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (McDade, 
J., concurring). 
 225. SAMAHA, supra note 9, at 229.  
 226. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825, 830 (Pa. 1959) (citing Francis Bowes Sayre, 
Criminal Responsibility for Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1930)).  
 227. Id. 
 228. Brief for Respondents, supra note 133, at 56. 
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and autonomy.”229 In the context of home rule ordinances, where 
someone faces significant legal sanctions as a result of their 
relationship with another person somehow connected to their home, 
and not based on their own wrongdoing, vicarious liability seems 
particularly egregious. 
Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that supporters of these 
kinds of ordinances have constructed narratives of fault around them. 
According to these narratives, those who are subject to home rule 
ordinances are, in some extralegal sense, blameworthy. Although not 
technically “at fault” in the legal sense, they are constructed as at 
fault in some larger moral sense. It seems that the absence of a legal 
fault element has created a void into which a nonlegal fault element 
has grown—to justify the use of strict liability and its accordant legal 
sanctions in this context. 
1. Failing to Govern and Be Governed.  One narrative of fault at 
work in the context of home rule ordinances is that the tenant or 
parent is at fault both in relation to her ability to govern and in 
relation to her willingness to be governed. The state arguably “regards 
the polity as a household, the occupants of which must be disciplined 
and directed,” and must in turn discipline and direct their own 
households.230 Government is, in some sense, a form of household 
management, and household management is, conversely, an 
important part of state governance.231 The idea of a “family 
government” that is a microcosm for the larger state is an old one: 
Aristotle began his Politics with a discussion of household 
governance, and how households are the “original seed of the 
polis.”232 Ordered homes become the prerequisite for an ordered 
state, and households struggling with social issues become a threat to 
 
 229. Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1043, 1050–51 (2013). 
 230. Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences and the Perils of Categorical Ambiguity, in 
LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION, supra note 77, at 77, 80. 
 231. Markus Dirk Dubber, “The Power to Govern Men and Things”: Patriarchal Origins of 
the Police Power in American Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (2004). Further, as scholars 
Elizabeth Burney and Loraine Gelsthorpe write, “[t]he State traditionally supports the ideal of 
well-functioning families, as a crucial element in the social order.” Elizabeth Burney & Loraine 
Gelsthorpe, Do We Need A ‘Naughty Step’? Rethinking the Parenting Order After Ten Years, 47 
HOW. J. 470, 470 (2008); see also Noa Ben-Asher, The Lawmaking Family, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
363, 363 (2012) (arguing that families create internal legal systems that govern their daily lives).  
 232. Dubber, supra note 77, at 30. 
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that order.233 Indeed, the connection between home governance and 
state governance has a special resonance at the city level, where 
Western culture has long mythologized that what happens in the 
household has a direct impact on the city.234 
The idea that a failure to govern one’s household is wrongful and 
thus may justifiably attract sanctions is particularly salient in the 
context of parental liability ordinances. Parental liability ordinances 
are often justified based on the intuition that “‘bad’ parents should be 
disciplined” for their failure to govern their households correctly.235 
Essentially, the child’s unlawful act demonstrates that the parents are 
“bad” at “ruling the roost,” and it is therefore fair to impose penalties 
on them.236 
Of course, the implicit assumption underlying the notion that a 
child’s unlawful act shows that his or her parents are “bad” is that 
good parents generally have control over their children.237 However, 
many parents and other people who have worked with or spent time 
with children and teenagers believe this assumption to be “unrealistic 
and naïve.”238 In reality, parents have quite limited means to actually 
control the behavior of their children, and even parents who “do 
everything right” may nevertheless have children who engage in 
misconduct.239 This is in part because of the myriad factors that 
contribute to a child’s behavior, of which parental influence is just 
 
 233. This is the flip side to the “notion oft heard that strong families lead to a strong 
nation.” MARKEL ET AL., supra note 158, at 1189.  
 234. The story of Oedipus helps to illustrate this point: his murder of his father created 
disorder in his family and household, and thus disorder in the city, in the form of the “plague 
upon Thebes.” Levinson, supra note 69, at 354. 
 235. Amy L. Tomaszewski, Note, From Columbine to Kazaa: Parental Liability in a New 
World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 573, 579 (2005) (citing Linda A. Chapin, Out of Control? The Uses 
and Abuses of Parental Liability Laws to Control Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 37 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 621, 624 (1997)).  
 236. In other words, a child’s wrongful act justifies a “role [for] politics [] where families 
have failed.” F. FIELD, NEIGHBOURS FROM HELL: THE POLITICS OF BEHAVIOUR (2003); John 
Flint & Judy Nixon, Governing Neighbours: Anti-Social Behavior Orders and New Forms of 
Regulating Conduct in the UK, 43 URB. STUD. 939, 948 (2006) (quoting FIELD, supra). 
 237. Elena R. Laskin, How Parental Liability Statutes Criminalize and Stigmatize Minority 
Mothers, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1206 (2000). 
 238. Id. 
 239. “No doubt family environment exerts significant influence on a child’s behavior. But on 
closer examination, scapegoating parents paints a remarkably incomplete picture. Indeed, in 
many families, parents may no longer be capable of influencing the behavior of their children. 
Many other powerful forces compete today for that role in teenagers’ lives.” Min Kang, Parents 
as Scapegoats, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15, 19 (2007). 
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one among many.240 Another powerful force is enculturation, or the 
environment in which children grow up. Most bullying experts will 
readily agree that peer groups play an important—if not the most 
important—role in whether children engage in bullying behaviors. 
Parental liability ordinances, though, appear to be “based entirely on 
folk wisdom” that parents should be able to control their children all 
the time.241 If they cannot, then they can be “coercively taught 
parenting skills, so they will become in control (and presumably then 
can be punished by harsher means if the children continue their 
delinquent behavior).”242 
In addition to suggesting that a failure to govern one’s household 
is blameworthy, home rule ordinances also blame parents and tenants 
for a reluctance to be governed. For instance, the narratives 
surrounding parental liability laws suggest that they will be levied 
when cities decide that parents are being uncooperative with them.243 
In the case of the Monona, Wisconsin, ordinance that holds parents 
liable for their children’s bullying behaviors, Monona’s police chief 
has indicated that fines will be levied only in situations in which the 
parents are uncooperative and do not make efforts to address the 
bullying.244 This theme of uncooperativeness also occurs in parental 
liability laws at the state level: the proposed, but ultimately defeated, 
Iowa bill that sought to hold parents responsible for their children’s 
bullying was also rooted in parental cooperation with the state.245 The 
first level of intervention was to be notification of the bullying 
behavior and an attempt to “work[] with the family” to address it.246 If 
parents resisted this intervention, the second level was court 
 
 240. “Most criminology and sociology theories, as well as empirical studies, generally 
indicate that not only the family, but economic status, academic achievement, racism and 
discrimination, peer groups, community attachment and susceptibility to media affects a child’s 
propensity” to engage in misconduct. Tammy Thurman, Parental Responsibility Laws: Are They 
The Answer to Juvenile Delinquency?, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 99, 107 (2003).  
 241. Chapin, supra note 235, at 654. 
 242. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 243. Similar ideas regarding duties to cooperate can be found in the welfare and child 
support context. See Naomi Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 965, 973–80 (1997). 
 244. Kuruvilla, supra note 97. 
 245. H.F. 143, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2013), available at http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/
Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=billinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=false&hbill=hf143. 
 246. Leigh, supra note 94. 
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mediation.247 The final level was prosecution, which could result in 
“community service, fines, or even jail time.”248 
Penalizing parental uncooperativeness can also be seen in state 
laws addressing truancy. A truancy reduction program in Michigan, 
for example, provided that when “parents did not cooperate with 
school officials, a warrant was sought for parental prosecution under 
the state’s compulsory attendance law. The key phrase here was that 
the parents targeted were uncooperative.”249 
This same language of cooperation was echoed in a town’s 
reasoning regarding enacting a chronic-nuisance ordinance that was 
meant to apply to domestic-abuse situations: 
It’s always disheartening for police officers to get calls that a 
boyfriend is beating up a girlfriend, and then the girlfriend drops the 
charges within a few days. It’s more frustrating when the offenders 
repeat the process over and over. . . . In addition, it’s a big waste of 
taxpayers’ dollars when police have to respond to nuisance calls and 
then to court without the benefit of cooperation from those who 
complained in the first place.250 
Cooperation also figures into the common practice of ordering 
women to get restraining orders against their intimate partners to 
avoid evictions under nuisance ordinances.251 If they refuse to 
cooperate and accept this form of city governance, eviction can 
follow. Compliance with a state notion of best practices for home 
governance becomes a requirement of maintaining stable housing and 
 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. 
 249. Justin W. Patchin, Holding Parents Responsible for Their Child’s Bullying, 
CYBERBULLYING RES. CENTER (June 17, 2013), http://cyberbullying.us/holding-parents-
responsible-for-their-childs-bullying (second emphasis added). Professor Patchin also noted, 
however, that in reality, “[o]nly 3 parents out of the nearly 300 families involved in the program 
fell into [the uncooperative] category.” Id. Most parents seem willing to help tackle their 
children’s bullying behaviors, as attested to by the fact that the informational brochure entitled 
“What If My Child Is The Bully?” is “one of the most frequently downloaded handouts on the 
website.” A. Pawlowski, Community Will Ticket Parents of Chronic Bullies, TODAY (June 3, 
2013, 1:59 PM), http://www.today.com/moms/community-will-ticket-parents-chronic-bullies-
6C10172548.  
 250. Rebecca Licavoli Adams, Note, California Eviction Protections for Victims of Domestic 
Violence: Additional Protections or Additional Problems?, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 
1, 12 (2012) (quoting Ron Gower, Police Calls: Responsibility Will Be Required in Coaldale, 
TIMES NEWS, Mar. 13, 2006, at 1). 
 251. For a discussion of this issue, see Suk, supra note 81, at 7.  
SWAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015 11:38 PM 
868 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:823 
avoiding legal penalty.252 Failure to cooperate or to be governed in 
this regard is portrayed as blameworthy, and thus able to legitimately 
attract legal sanctions. 
2. Failing to Control Criminality.  In the nuisance context, the 
failure to govern one’s household is linked to another powerful 
narrative of blame: the failure to control another’s violence or 
criminality. In addition to placing blame on parents and tenants for 
failing to govern their households, when nuisance is based in domestic 
violence, a story is told in which an individual’s failure to control 
another’s criminality is blameworthy. In this narrative, those who 
experience domestic violence are specifically faulted for failing to 
control their partner’s behavior.253 According to this story, their 
failure to control the abuse is blameworthy and should attract the 
sanction of eviction. 
Many nuisance citations and evictions come from domestic-
violence incidents.254 Indeed, a recent groundbreaking study analyzing 
all the nuisance citations issued in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 2008 and 
2009 found that nearly a third of these citations were generated by 
 
 252. For example, Lakisha Briggs, the Pennsylvania woman who was evicted after her 
boyfriend nearly killed her, was, prior to her eviction, “ordered to obtain assistance from the 
justice system [in the form of a Protection from Abuse order] as a condition to maintaining her 
housing, regardless of her fears of future and escalated violence.” Brief of Amicus Curiae of the 
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, et al. at 20, Briggs v. Norristown (E.D. Pa. 
May 31, 2013) (No. 2:13-cv-2191).  
 253. This narrative falls into the gendered tradition of holding women responsible for men’s 
criminality. This tradition is most obvious in the context of sexual assault, where “to some 
extent criminal justice officials (and others) have always considered female victims of sexual 
assault and rape as responsible for failing to minimize the opportunities for the offense.” Sharyn 
L. Roach Anleu, The Role of Civil Sanctions in Social Control: A Socio-Legal Examination, in 
CIVIL REMEDIES AND CRIME PREVENTION 21, 34 (Lorraine Green Mazerolle & Jan Roehl 
eds., 1998). 
 254. Dekalb, Chicago, offers an example of the number of nuisance citations connected to 
domestic violence. The city reported that in 2013, it notified landlords of 489 calls to police that 
could trigger eviction. Katie Dahlstrom, DeKalb’s Crime Free Housing Program Gets Mixed 
Reviews, DAILY CHRONICLE (Feb. 27, 2014, 3:36 PM), http://www.daily-chronicle
.com/2014/02/26/dekalbs-crime-free-housing-program-gets-mixed-reviews/ajjphlv/?page=1. The 
reasons for the calls to police were varied. “100 were for disorderly house complaints—loud 
parties or noise late at night. Another 97 were domestic battery and 45 were for possession of 
marijuana. The remainder ran the gamut from underage drinking to mob action.” Id. Of those, 
56 resulted in eviction, 31 resulted in individuals being barred from a particular residence, and 
18 tenants left “voluntarily.” Id.  
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domestic violence.255 The same study quoted many instances in which 
both landlords and the police who worked with them to evict tenants 
under the nuisance ordinances blamed female tenants for the 
“nuisance” associated with domestic abuse incidents.256 Landlords and 
police explicitly “assigned to battered women the responsibility for 
curbing the abuse” and often viewed eviction as the natural and fair 
consequence of a failure to do so.257 One Milwaukee landlord 
(described as “a middle-aged white man who owns 114 units, mostly 
in poor black neighborhoods”), offered his views on nuisance 
citations related to domestic violence at his properties: 
Like I tell my tenants: You can’t be calling the police because your 
boyfriend hit you again. They’re not your big babysitter. It 
happened last week, and you threw him out. But then you let him 
back in, and it happens again and again. Either learn from the first 
experience or, you know, leave. Don’t take him back and get hit 
because you tell him, I don’t know, “I don’t want to sleep with 
you.”258 
Another landlord warned his tenant in a letter: 
Because the numerous calls from this address, the police has [sic] 
identified the property as a nuisance property. . . . Many of the calls 
involved physical altercations with another individual, identified as 
your boyfriend and ex-boyfriend who appears to be living at the 
unit. . . . This is your notice to cease this behavior and to cure these 
problems. . . . If these activities continue, your lease will be 
terminated.259 
And in a letter to the Milwaukee Police Department, from whom 
most of the eviction directives originated,260 one landlord wrote: 
The Tenants have been required to vacate the unit or terminate the 
causes via a 30-day [eviction] notice. It does not matter if they are 
 
 255. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 118. It should be noted that the study excluded 
public housing “[b]ecause the nuisance property ordinance focuses on the private housing 
market.” Id. at 123. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 134. 
 258. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
 259. Id. at 134 (alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
 260. The nuisance ordinances are usually enforced in the following manner: a city official 
who has received a report from the police regarding an incident sends a letter to the landlord, 
indicating that the landlord must evict or face a series of escalating sanctions. The landlord is 
often requested to write a letter in response indicating what actions have been or will be taken. 
Id. at 122. 
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the cause of the problems or not. It is their responsibility to prevent 
the problems at all times.261 
And in yet another example of a letter to the police, another 
local landlord wrote: 
First, we are evicting Sheila M., the caller for numerous help [sic] 
from police. . . . She has been beaten by her “man” who kicks in 
doors and goes to jail for 1 or 2 days. . . . We suggested she obtain a 
gun and kill him in self-defense, but evidently she hasn’t. Therefore, 
we are evicting her.262 
Leaving aside the profoundly disturbing suggestion in the above 
quote—that a woman suffering domestic abuse must engage in the 
compliance behavior of shooting her husband to avoid eviction—
these examples suggest that landlords and police construct their own 
notions of a tenant’s fault, one rooted in the failure of abused women 
to control their intimate partners and stop the violence directed at 
them.263 This narrative, and the sentiments behind it, were echoed in 
the comments to a New York Times article about domestic violence 
and nuisance evictions. One landlord wrote, “‘if the tenant is unwilling 
to make better judgments about the men they allow to live with their 
children, then we feel we have to act.’”264 According to this narrative, 
female tenants who experience domestic abuse are at fault for not 
exercising better judgment, for not leaving, and for failing to control 
the violence of their intimate partners.265 
B. Vulnerability as Fault 
Arguably, the real “nuisance” being targeted in these domestic-
violence instances is a person’s vulnerability. A call to 911 is a call for 
 
 261. Id. at 135 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 262. Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). 
 263. Other examples include a landlord who “noted that a tenant’s 911 abuse calls had to do 
with a ‘domestic violence issue that she seems to have no ability to control.’ The landlord 
continued, ‘Her lease is up at the end of May and she has been counseled that if her behavior 
does not change she will also be non-renewed.’” Id. (emphasis added).  
 264. Max Liboiron, Twenty-First Century Nuisance Law and the Continued Entanglement of 
Race, Gender, Property, and Violence, DISCARD STUD. (Aug. 19, 2013), http://discardstudies
.wordpress.com/2013/08/19/twenty-first-century-nuisance-law-and-the-continued-entanglement-
of-race-gender-property-and-violence (emphasis added). 
 265. This is particularly troubling when one considers that domestic violence itself is “a 
crime of control.” Adams, supra note 250, at 4 (citing John C. Nelson, Ronald B. Adrine, Elaine 
Alpert, Sara Buel & Corinne Graffunder, Domestic Violence in the Adult Years, 33 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 28, 29 (2005)).  
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help, an expressed need for assistance. Under the nuisance ordinances, 
this call is also the basis for eviction.266 One explicit rationale behind 
nuisance ordinances is the idea that the residents in these properties 
are overusing the limited resources of police and emergency 
personnel; the need that is prompting these visits is cast as 
excessive.267 
Indeed, there are important links between vulnerability and 
home rule ordinances at large.268 Although home rule ordinances 
potentially implicate all parents and tenants that reside in cities that 
have passed these ordinances, in practice, “the burden falls 
disproportionately on a select few.”269 Due to the demographics of 
parents and renters, as well as the manner in which home rule 
ordinances are enforced, the “select few” are often members of 
vulnerable groups.270 The results of the Milwaukee study, for instance, 
suggest that nuisance ordinances are heavily inflected with issues of 
gender, class, and race.271 The study authors found that “[p]roperties 
in black neighborhoods disproportionately received citations,” and 
 
 266. A similar slippage occurs in the nuisance context. The ACLU lawyer representing 
Lakisha Briggs told the New York Times: “The problem with these ordinances is that they turn 
victims of crime who are pleading for emergency assistance into ‘nuisances’ in the eyes of the 
city.” Liboiron, supra, note 264. One academic offers an insightful analysis of this quote, 
suggesting that it taps into a long-running historical vein that connects race with nuisance. As he 
notes, this “turn of phrase, whereby people—women, and usually black women—are turned into 
both a form of pollution and a force that precludes the enjoyment of one’s property,” is “part of a 
long historical trend.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 267. Cari Fais, Note, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic Nuisance 
Laws to Domestic Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1181–82 (2008). 
 268. In legal scholarship, group-based ideas of vulnerability are often understood to be in 
conflict with “universality-based” ideas of vulnerability. “On the one hand, vulnerability is often 
used to analyze specific populations; on the other hand, Martha Fineman has developed a 
vulnerability thesis that is expressly universal in its scope and ‘post-identity.’” Lourdes Peroni & 
Alexandra Timmer, Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of An Emerging Concept in European 
Human Rights Convention Law, 11 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 1056, 1060 (2013). Here, “vulnerable 
groups” is meant to convey the idea that certain identity-based groups have historically been 
subjected to discrimination, and that although “people are differently vulnerable,” vulnerability 
is “partially constructed depending on economic, political, and social processes of inclusion and 
exclusion.” Id. 
 269. Buerger, supra note 54, at 110. A significant portion of the population is parents or 
guardians, and over one hundred million tenants live in rental properties nationwide. 
“According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2009 American Housing Survey (AHS), there are 38.6 
million occupied rental properties in the United States, which more than 100 million tenants call 
home.” Hawkins, supra note 14, at 66.  
 270. Rental housing often conjures up associations with “urban ‘concrete jungles.’” In truth, 
though, “the majority of renters live outside city centers, in ‘suburban or nonmetropolitan 
areas.’” Hawkins, supra note 14, at 66. 
 271. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 136–39.  
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those located in more integrated black neighborhoods had the highest 
likelihood of being deemed nuisances.272 The empirics of the study 
were as follows: “[o]f the 503 properties deemed nuisances, 319 were 
located in black neighborhoods.”273 The next largest number, 152, 
came from mixed neighborhoods, but of these mixed-neighborhood 
properties, 124 deemed nuisances were in neighborhoods “in which 
the proportion of black residents exceeded that of white or Hispanic 
residents.”274 Only 18 properties were deemed nuisances in white 
neighborhoods and 14 properties were deemed nuisances in Hispanic 
neighborhoods.275 
Nuisance laws also affect other vulnerable group members, 
particularly the poor and disabled.276 The New York Times article 
setting out the case of Lakisha Briggs also included a brief vignette 
about William Zarnoth, a sixty-two year old Milwaukee bartender.277 
He was evicted after too many 911 calls arising from a dispute 
between his roommates and another tenant in the building.278 The 
eviction record made it difficult for him to find another apartment, 
leaving him in an eighty-dollar-per-week room without cooking 
facilities.279 
Parental liability ordinances also have their greatest impact on 
vulnerable groups, particularly single-parent households, most of 
which are headed by women.280 Households with single mothers are 
more prevalent than households with two parents and households 
with single fathers—leaving single mothers as the persons most likely 
to be affected by parental liability ordinances.281 In situations where 
“the father-figure leaves the household or was never part of it,” the 
 
 272. Id. at 117. 
 273. Id. at 125. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id.  
 276. For an examination of the impact of the one-strike policy in federal public housing 
upon the disabled, see generally Anne C. Fleming, Protecting the Innocent: The Future of 
Mentally Disabled Tenants in Federally Subsidized Housing After HUD v. Rucker, 40 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197 (2005). 
 277. Eckholm, supra note 199. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id.  
 280. See Dimitris, supra note 11, at 676 (“Opponents [of parental liability ordinances] argue 
that parental responsibility statutes impose fines and imprisonment on parents who already 
have problems controlling their child in large part due to their financial shortcomings and lack 
of being physically proximate to the child.”).  
 281. Id. at 675. 
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mother will be the one subject to the ordinance because it is she, 
rather than the absent parent, who will be regarded as “failing to 
control” the child.”282 In fact, single motherhood itself is often 
associated with fault. It is commonly perceived as being associated 
with, or perhaps even causative of, juvenile delinquency.283 It is 
“presented as having a devastating impact on the institution of the 
family in the first instance and the fate of society in the long run.”284 
Socioeconomic status also plays a significant role in bullying. 
Countries with the highest wealth disparity also have the highest 
bullying rates.285 Further, although bullies can be found at every layer 
of social strata, they are slightly more likely to come from middle-to 
low income backgrounds.286 Also, bullying ordinances may tend to 
have their largest impact upon racial minorities, as Carson City, 
California, recognized in its decision to not enact an antibullying 
parental liability ordinance.287 
Also, although parental liability ordinances subject all parents to 
the potential for fines and other escalating legal sanctions, parents 
who rent may face the additional consequence of eviction under the 
crime-free program. Crime-free lease addendums link the burden of 
security with home ownership because only homeowners can rest 
assured that they will not be displaced if their friends or family 
members engage in unlawful activities.288 Freedom from displacement 
becomes a perk of home ownership, whereas those who choose to 
rent or must rent for financial reasons are subject to a different set of 
interventions. 
Often, socioeconomic, gender, and racial divides separate home 
renters from homeowners. Vulnerable groups like racial minorities, 
 
 282. Id. 
 283. Fineman, supra note 157, at 960. 
 284. Id. at 959 (quoting Martha Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 274, 287 (1991)).  
 285. Pernille Due et al., Socioeconomic Inequality in Exposure to Bullying During 
Adolescence: A Comparative, Cross-Sectional, Multilevel Study in 35 Countries, 99 AM. J. OF 
PUB. HEALTH 907, 913 (2009). 
 286. Neil Tippett & Dieter Wolke, Socioeconomic Status and Bullying: A Meta-Analysis, 104 
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 48, 48 (2014). 
 287. Part of the opposition to the bill was based in the idea that it could be used in a racially 
discriminatory manner, to “further criminalize Black and Brown youth.” Muhammad, supra 
note 88.  
 288. Professor David Garland posits that there are increasing and “developing divisions 
between property-owning classes and those social groups who are deemed a threat to property.” 
Garland, supra note 44, at 463. Home rule ordinances may be such a distinction. 
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women, and the disabled are more likely to live in rental housing, and 
are therefore most often subject to these ordinances.289 For instance, 
in Illinois, where over one hundred municipalities have adopted 
crime-free programs, the percentage of “non-Hispanic white 
households” that rent is only 25%.290 In contrast, “59.1% of African-
American households, 47.4% of Hispanic households, and 38.3% of 
Asian households rent.”291 In terms of gender, “[f]emale-headed 
households are more than twice as likely to rent as the general 
population.”292 And, on a national basis, “41.8% of households with a 
nonelderly person with a disability rent, as compared to just 31.6% of 
households that rent overall.”293 These households are asked to 
shoulder the burden of preventing criminal activity in a way that 
members of other groups and homeowners are not. Ironically, these 
groups are also the least likely to have the resources available to 
engage in robust and successful third-party policing. 
Some have argued that “[t]he poor (and perhaps particularly the 
working poor) frequently are seen as being at fault, and are found to 
be negligent or irresponsible if not wholly criminal in their actions.”294 
There is arguably an element of this in some of the narratives 
surrounding home rule ordinances. For instance, there exists a 
curious slippage, or a sort of conflation, of the actual wrongdoer with 
the person held vicariously liable for that wrongdoing. Rather than 
portraying the parent or tenant as the means to an end (that end 
being deterrence), parents and tenants are themselves configured as 
wrongdoers in a way that connects to vulnerability. In Rucker, for 
example, after suggesting that deterrence and enforcement 
justifications supported the one-strike policy’s strict-liability nature, 
the Court offered a final justification for the imposition of strict 
liability: “Regardless of knowledge, a tenant who cannot control drug 
crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which 
 
 289. WERTH, supra note 123, at 5. These populations were also the most affected by the 
precursor to the crime-free lease addendum, the one-strike policy in federal housing. Austin, 
supra note 11, at 275–76. For more discussion of the ways in which policies connected to the war 
on drugs particularly impact women, see generally Phyllis Goldfarb, Counting the Drug War’s 
Female Casualties, 6 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 277 (2002). 
 290. WERTH, supra note 123, at 5 n.13.  
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Tyler & Segady, supra note 11, at 89.  
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threaten health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other residents 
and the project.”295 
Thus, according to the Court, the tenant herself is at fault. She 
cannot control drug or other crime, and thus becomes a “threat” 
herself, endangering the security of the other tenants and the 
community at large.296 Whereas earlier in the opinion the Court held 
that “control” merely meant “permitted access to the premises,” 
when considering the strict-liability nature of the one-strike policy, 
the Court redefined “control” to mean the ability to govern or impose 
one’s will upon others—and the lack of control was itself 
blameworthy.297 In other words, it is the tenant’s lack of control of 
others, her lack of power, or her vulnerability that renders her a 
threat to security.298 
C. The Framing Effect 
Vicarious liability also performs a powerful framing function for 
home rule ordinances. It suggests that the blame for criminal or drug-
related behavior falls upon the individual wrongdoer and his or her 
social or familial others, to the exclusion of everything else. As with 
the dominant criminal law narrative, the focus in this narrative is very 
narrow. The criminal law tends to tell stories of “individuals, as 
opposed to complex systems and institutions,”299 and explains crime as 
a “problem of individual criminal pathology.”300 It “obscures the 
economic and sociological conditions” connected to crime, and 
 
 295. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002) (emphasis added) 
(quotation mark omitted). 
 296. “Ultimately, according to Rucker, families who are unable or unwilling to control 
household members who engage in criminal activities threaten the health and safety of other 
residents in the development.” Rodney, supra note 137, at 746. The court in Dayton 
Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Kilgore, 958 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011), made a 
similar point. Id. at 190. 
 297. Kilgore, 958 N.E.2d at 189 (quoting Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131). 
 298. The disease metaphors that surround the social problems of bullying, drugs, and 
criminality also contribute to the idea of a shared blameworthiness. These “social ills” are 
described as “epidemic, pandemic, and contagious,” and as “viral.” Ahrens, supra note 160, at 
1675, 1688. Those words make it easy to imagine members of the same household sharing the 
same affliction.  
 299. Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and Sexual 
Assault Trials, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437, 468 (2006) 
 300. Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 624 
(2009). 
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thereby “relieves ‘pressure on the government and society’” to 
address these underlying factors.301 
Vicarious liability in the home rule ordinances widens this frame 
ever-so-slightly, so that a wrongdoer’s social or familial others are 
also included in the picture. However, additional complex 
contributors remain invisible and outside the borders of this new 
framing. Social dynamics are erased and recast as “characteristics of 
individuals,” and the larger, structural factors that are correlated with 
crime and drug abuse—like poverty, economic inequality, and lack of 
opportunities—are ignored in favor of a simpler tale, according to 
which the individual wrongdoer and his or her family are the entire 
problem, and that problem can be solved through displacement.302 
IV.  SANCTIONING NONCOMPLIANCE 
This Part explores how the vicarious liability nature of home rule 
ordinances pulls not just primary wrongdoers into the orbit of 
criminalization, but also their familial or social relations. Part IV.A 
discusses how those familial or social others then become subject to 
the same kinds of stigma that often follow those actually convicted of 
crimes. Further, those familial or social others become subject to the 
legal sanctions provided for in the ordinances, such as fines and, more 
significantly, eviction. Part IV.B addresses the significant negative 
consequences associated with employing eviction as a remedy. 
Eviction is a difficult event for anyone, but for low-income tenants, it 
can be devastating. Indeed, the end result of eviction for low-income 
tenants is often homelessness. Imposing eviction—and the resultant 
homelessness—on those who are unable to prevent their intimate 
others from engaging in wrongful acts implies that their failure has 
rendered them unworthy of a home, and thereby creates a “home 
rule” regarding who can maintain stable housing. 
A. Criminalization and Stigmatization 
The crime-free lease addendums and nuisance ordinances 
technically make tenants “civilly liable for the alleged criminal 
 
 301. Id. (quotations marks omitted). 
 302. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, 
AUTONOMY AND LAW 73 (2011) (quoting Renée Römkens, Law as a Trojan Horse: Unintended 
Consequences of Rights-Based Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 265, 285 (2001). 
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conduct” of others.303 The parental liability ordinances go further and 
may make parents criminally liable for the alleged unlawful conduct 
of their children. All three ordinances have the same effect: tenants 
and parents are implicated in the criminality of those in their social 
circles and family groups. Crime thus becomes framed as a problem 
that results not just from individual pathology but also from the 
failure of family and friends to prevent the behavior. The ordinances 
“extend responsibility (and more importantly, liability) for 
‘community safety’” into the home and onto the shoulders of tenants 
and parents, and link the wrongful act with a failure of responsibility 
on their part.304 Thus, through vicarious liability, social and familial 
relations become implicated in the wrongful act itself. Indeed, this is 
the very definition of vicarious liability: it imputes a wrongful act 
from one person to another, based on the relationship between 
them.305 In the home rule ordinance narrative, then, individual 
wrongdoers as well as their social and familial relations are 
responsible for any unlawful acts. 
Grouping primary wrongdoers with their familial or social others 
places all parties beneath the “criminal” umbrella, under which no 
one is “innocent.”306 Friends and family members often suffer 
“secondary stigma and ostracism” because of their relationship to 
those convicted of crimes.307 Home rule ordinances magnify this 
stigma, lumping friends and family into the category of “criminal” 
despite a lack of individual wrongdoing (and even though the 
underlying bad act may not even have constituted a crime in the strict 
sense).308 This is a significant event: “As Professor Alexandra 
Natapoff recently observed, for a person who has been publicly 
transformed from law-abiding citizen into criminal, a significant 
psycho-social line has been crossed.”309 Families become subject to 
“othering,” a common practice of social control that systematically 
 
 303. Mele, supra note 11, at 124.  
 304. Id. at 129. 
 305. SAMAHA, supra note 9, at 229.  
 306. As one proponent of the crime-free lease addendum asserted, there “is no innocent 
resident.” Chaos to Calm with Crime Free Multi Housing, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED 
POLICING, http://www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2011/11-08.pdf (last visited Jan. 
16, 2015). 
 307. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1108 
(2013). 
 308. See supra text accompanying note 134. 
 309. Id. at 1112 (quotation marks omitted). 
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denies certain groups “full participation in civil society” and labels 
them with “pariah status.”310 
B. Eviction 
Although the parental liability ordinances that specify fines as 
their attendant sanction are problematic, the stigmatizing and 
disenfranchising impact of the eviction sanction renders it an 
especially devastating event, particularly for low-income tenants.311 
Homes serve more than just a functional purpose. In addition to 
providing physical shelter, homes “can serve as a ‘person’s security, 
self-identity, and center for social interaction.’ A home represents a 
family’s safe haven, . . . ‘a place of privacy and security.’”312 
Furthermore, “[i]n terms of self-identity, a home can reflect its 
occupant’s sense of self. It provides space to develop and express an 
identity.”313 It provides a place to nurture oneself and others.314 It is 
the site for most familial and many social interactions, a center for 
interacting with others. In essence, home is “a means for the physical 
and social location of a person, his private life and his social 
relationships.”315 
Given all the practical, psychic, and social attachments to home, 
it is not surprising that moving is commonly cited as the third most 
stressful life event, after death and divorce.316 Eviction, or forced 
moving, is even more so, as it lacks the hope or upward mobility 
associated with most voluntary moves. Eviction is “a severely 
consequential and traumatic event. Researchers have linked eviction 
 
 310. Mele & Miller, supra note 183, at 22 (quotation marks omitted). 
 311. Fines can be very difficult for low-income families to pay. Such sanctions are “insidious 
in part because they often are assessed with little to no attention paid to the defendant’s 
circumstances,” and therefore, they often result in “severe consequences” for individuals and 
families. Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 281 
(2014). 
 312. Heinle, supra note 173, at 229. 
 313. Id. at 229 n.104 (quoting Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protections for Home Dwellers: 
Caulking the Cracks to Preserve Occupancy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 285 (2006)).  
 314. Id. at 229. 
 315. HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [2002] (Isr.). 
 316. Jeff Wuorio, Make Your Move Less Stressful, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2014, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/weekend/living/2014/01/17/make-your-move-less-
stressful/4531323. 
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to homelessness, material hardship, increased residential mobility, job 
loss, depression, and even suicide.”317 
Although eviction is stressful for anyone, those with enough 
socioeconomic resources are usually able to find equivalent housing. 
For low-income tenants, however, “[t]he mark of eviction on one’s 
record often prevents tenants from securing affordable housing in a 
decent neighborhood, and it disqualifies them from many housing 
programs.”318 Thus, “[f]or many, if not most, low-income tenants, 
eviction leads to immediate homelessness.”319 In part, this is because 
of the stigmatization associated with evictions: 
Evictions carry a stigma. Many landlords will not rent to persons 
who have been evicted, and an eviction can also ban a person from 
affordable housing programs. Tenants who are evicted often lose not 
only their homes but their possessions as well, stripping them of the 
few assets they had. Once evicted, tenants often find themselves 
forced to move from one undesirable location to another.320 
Crime, mediated through the civil law, serves as the trigger that 
sets a household on this downward spiral.321 Just as in the one-strike 
 
 317. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 137. Eviction also has a significant negative 
impact upon children. It can lead to poorer school performance, increased truancy, and an 
increased risk of dropping-out. Matthew Desmond, Weihua An, Richelle Winkler & Thomas 
Feriss, Evicting Children, 92 SOC. FORCES 303, 303 (2013). Further, “increased residential 
mobility has also been linked to higher rates of adolescence violence and children’s health 
risks.” Id. These health risks are exacerbated when evictions force families to relocate to 
substandard homes. Id. Indeed, eviction also negatively impacts entire communities. It can 
“contribute to neighborhood disadvantage,” “unravel the fabric of a community,” and thwart 
“efforts to establish and maintain social capital, local cohesion and community investment. 
Eviction, then, can result in negative consequences, not only for children of evicted households, 
but also for all children who live in high-eviction neighborhoods.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 318. Id. Gentrification is also hinted at in the eviction policies. “As a process, gentrification 
entails often-intentional displacement of poor residents, class conflict, and, at times, violence.” 
Kaplan-Lyman, supra note 41, at 187. It has been suggested that the one-strike policy is 
performing similar work in Chicago. One study found that “the number of one-strike cases 
across the city increased sharply in CHA developments where demolition was eminent,” and 
also rose dramatically in the mixed-income units created to replace those housing units. Caputo, 
supra note 221. As one community organizer stated, “These policies are intended to push 
people out.” Id.  
 319. Levy, supra note 12, at 564. 
 320. Matthew Desmond, Poor Black Women are Evicted at Alarming Rates, Setting Off a 
Chain of Hardship, MACARTHUR FOUND. 2 (Mar. 2014) http://www.macfound.org/media/
files/HHM_Research_Brief_-_Poor_Black_Women_Are_Evicted_at_Alarming_Rates.pdf. 
 321. Indeed, even things that are only “crimelike” serve as triggers. One Las Vegas landlord 
describes what triggered a family’s eviction in her building: “Because of our Block Watch 
efforts, we helped police find a juvenile who was shooting an air gun in the neighborhood. . . . 
Within a couple of days a suspect was apprehended by police from information received from 
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policy context, the ability or inability to control crime has become an 
“an unacknowledged way” of determining who is or is not worthy of 
having a home.322 Home rule ordinances serve as a sorting tool, but 
one that only applies to certain portions of the population. This raises 
questions of “equity across economic class lines,” for while a renting 
family subject to a crime-free lease addendum might find itself 
homeless following one member’s “simple possession or use of a 
small quantity of cocaine,” for a home-owning middle-class family, 
that same offense might result only in judicially mandated drug 
treatment.323 
Despite the significance of eviction, and the fact that it is often a 
precursor to homelessness for low-income tenants, courts have held 
that eviction is not technically a “punishment.”324 For civil crime-free 
and nuisance ordinances to be considered “punishment,” the test is 
“‘whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or 
effect . . . as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy 
 
Stanford Court’s Block Watchers. The Crime Free Lease Addendum was used to evict the 
family from the community.” Crime Free Multi-Housing Program: Landlord Training Manual, 
LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lvmpd.com/ProtectYourself/CrimeFreeMulti
Housing/tabid/110/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
 322. SIMON, supra note 49, at 196. 
 323. Weil, supra note 11, at 177, 178. Not surprisingly given the demographic of renters and 
those affected by home rule ordinances,  
[t]he most common family composition in the homeless population is a female with a 
child or children. Forty percent of the homeless population is made up of families 
with children. Of those families, eighty-four percent are female-headed. Families of 
color are particularly likely to be homeless, and more than fifty percent of the 
homeless population is African American or Latino. This population is 
demographically similar to the population living in subsidized housing, although an 
even greater percentage of those living in subsidized housing are families with 
children.  
Madeline Howard, Note, Subsidized Housing Policy: Defining the Family, 22 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 97, 103 (2007) (footnotes omitted).  
 324. Levy, supra note 12, at 558 n.121 (citing City of New York v. Wright, 618 N.Y.S.2d 938, 
939 (N.Y. App. Term 1994)). The dissent at the intermediate appellate level in Rucker made a 
similar observation:  
[E]victions in these circumstances are not punitive. They are remedial. A civil 
sanction is punitive when it serves “either retributive or deterrent purposes.” Eviction 
serves the classic purpose of a contractual remedy—it returns the parties to “as good 
a position as that occupied . . . before the contract was made.” The remedy of eviction 
alone is not punitive. 
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. 
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (citations omitted). The fact that the city often requires landlords 
to evict on the basis of crime-free lease addendums could, however, change this analysis. See 
infra note 334.  
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into a criminal penalty.’”325 Whether a sanction can be classified as a 
“punishment” has significant legal consequences, but “[s]uch legal 
distinctions . . . likely mean very little” to those upon whom the 
sanctions are visited.326 For example, to “a mother who loses her 
apartment due to the actions of her son . . . eviction feels clearly 
punitive.”327 Paying attention to those who, like the mother referenced 
above, are “at the receiving end of these exercises of state power” 
reminds us that the “blurring of boundaries” between civil regulation 
and criminal punishment is not merely a problem of conceptual 
incoherence for legal scholars, but also one of perceptual legitimacy 
for those subject to such sanctions.328 
V.  CHALLENGING HOME RULE ORDINANCES AND  
CREATING NEW POSSIBILITIES 
Some of “those who are at the receiving end of these exercises of 
state power” have begun challenging home rule ordinances in the 
courts.329 Part V.A offers a brief outline of the emerging legal 
landscape challenging home rule ordinances. Part V.B examines the 
shortcomings of the evidence supporting home rule ordinances, and 
suggests alternative approaches the municipalities could consider 
instead. These alternative approaches arguably both better target the 
social problems motivating the home rules ordinances, and avoid the 
negative impacts that the ordinances impose. 
A. Challenging Home Rules 
Advocates have launched three main avenues of challenge. The 
first line of argument is that home rule ordinances exceed the bounds 
of the home rule authority grant. The second major basis for 
challenging these laws is that they conflict with state laws. The third 
ground is that the ordinances violate federal or state constitutions, or 
other remedial statutes. In this regard, advocates have had some 
 
 325. Levy, supra note 12, at 558 n.121 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 
(1997)). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. The eviction policies bear an uncanny resemblance to the “move along” policies 
initially employed to force undesirables out of public spaces. Richard C. Schragger, The Limits 
of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 372 (2001).  
 328. Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merill Umphrey, On the Blurred Boundary 
Between Regulation and Punishment, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION, supra 
note 77, at 1, 7. 
 329. Id. 
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success arguing that parental liability ordinances violate substantive 
due process, crime-free ordinances violate procedural due process, 
and nuisance ordinances violate both due process and the First 
Amendment. 
1. Exceeds Grant of Home Rule Authority.  Because home rule 
ordinances usually rely upon the grant of home rule authority for 
their existence, they are vulnerable to arguments that they exceed the 
bounds of that authority. For example, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, a 
group of landlords successfully challenged a mandated crime-free 
lease addendum.330 Landlords, like evicted tenants, are often unhappy 
with these ordinances for a variety of reasons. First, landlords must 
invest both time and money when evicting tenants: the process can be 
long and legal expenses can total in the hundreds or thousands.331 
Second, the landlord must serve as a de facto “criminal prosecutor” in 
proceedings in which they bear the burden of proving, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the “tenant or tenant’s guest performed a criminal 
act.”332 This role requires a significant amount of legwork, including 
gathering evidence like witness testimony, records, and documents.333 
More fundamentally, landlords may resent having to perform these 
activities and evict people whom, either as a matter of business 
judgment or for personal reasons, they do not wish to evict.334 
 
 330. Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, No. EQCV069920, available at 
http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-
11.pdf . 
 331. Editorial, Landlord-Tenant Ordinance Fails the Test, GAZETTE (Apr. 3, 2014, 3:09 PM), 
http://thegazette.com/2011/07/16/landlord-tenant-ordinance-fails-the-test. Indeed, because 
crime-free lease addendums (and nuisance ordinances) increase a landlord’s cost of doing 
business, they may result in reducing low-income rental housing. Letter from Katherine E. 
Walz, Jeremy Bergstrom & Emily Werth, Sargent Shriver Nat’l Ctr. on Poverty Law to 
Rockford City Council (Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://povertylaw.org/sites/default/
files/webfiles/Letter%20to%20Belleville%20City%20Council%20on%20Crime%20Free%20H
ousing%20Ordinance.pdf. 
 332. Richard Magnone, Crime Free Addendums in Illinois, CHICAGOEVICTION.COM (July 7, 
2011), http://chicagoeviction.com/2011/07/crime-free-addendums-in-illinois. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Indeed, while the one-strike policy allowed housing authorities to evict tenants who 
failed to prevent the wrongful actions of others, it did not require that they do so. Housing 
authorities were free to use the “innocent tenant” defense if they felt it appropriate. Rachel 
Hannaford, Comment, Trading Due Process Rights for Shelter: Rucker and Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Public Housing Leases, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 140 (2003). In contrast, cities 
often require private landlords to evict on the basis of crime-free lease addendum violations, or 
face a series of escalating sanctions. 
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The Cedar Rapids landlord association, a nonprofit corporation, 
alleged that the ordinance mandating crime-free lease addendums 
violated the city’s home rule powers. The home rule grant at issue 
gave cities a broad power to “exercise any power and perform any 
function . . . appropriate to protect and preserve the rights, privileges, 
and property” of the city and “to preserve and improve the peace, 
safety, health, welfare, comfort, and convenience of its residents,” but 
explicitly excluded “the power to “enact private or civil law governing 
civil relationships.”335 The association argued that the ordinance fell 
within the exclusion, and the court agreed. The judge held that this 
sort of limitation to the freedom of contract between a landlord and a 
tenant was indeed an attempt to “enact private or civil law governing 
civil relationships.”336 
2. Conflicts with State Law.  In addition to the finding that the 
city ordinance exceeded home rule authority, the court in Landlords 
of Linn County v. City of Cedar Rapids also held that the ordinance 
was in conflict with the Iowa law setting out grounds for eviction.337 
The state law provided that “clear and present danger presented by a 
tenant” was a basis for eviction.338 The court found that the city’s 
expansion of this standard to encompass “all criminal law violations, 
including simple misdemeanors,” and to include not only a tenant’s 
own violations, but also those committed by guests, even without the 
tenant’s knowledge, “was not reconcilable” with this state standard.339 
 
 335. IOWA CODE ANN. § 364.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2014). Over one hundred years ago, 
American cities were granted home rule authority. This authority allows them “to legislate on a 
broad range of social and economic policies without prior state legislative approval.” Paul A. 
Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1100 (2012). The range 
of acceptable legislative areas typically includes those of “local” or “municipal” concern, and 
often excludes certain areas like taxing and spending powers, or areas of private or civil law. 
DAVID J. MCCARTHY, JR. & LAURIE REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 
26 (5th ed. 2003). 
 336. Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, No. EQCV069920, available at 
http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-
11.pdf . Although the contractual nature of the relationship in this instance rendered the eviction 
policy void, the contractual nature of the landlord–tenant relationship led to the opposite result 
in Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). There, the Supreme Court held that because the government 
was acting as a landlord, and the basis for eviction was a contractual violation, as a matter of the 
private law between landlord and tenant, a strict-liability standard was acceptable. Id. at 136. 
 337. Landlords of Linn Cnty., No. EQCV069920, at 3.  
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
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Crime-free lease addendums have caused similar state–city 
tension in Wisconsin. At one point, Wisconsin rejected the possibility 
of cities mandating crime-free lease addendums based in strict 
liability and created a statutory ban that voids such lease terms.340 
Under that statute, tenants could not be evicted on a vicarious 
liability standard for criminal activity on or near the premises.341 
A parental liability ordinance in a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio, 
was also recently struck down on the grounds that it conflicted with a 
state law.342 The ordinance did “not require a showing that the parent 
specifically knew about or contributed to the child’s violation or 
criminal wrong,” and provided that a third offense could result in a 
180-day jail term for the violating parent.343 Under the ordinance, 
parents could raise the defense that they had taken reasonable steps 
to control the child, but the Ohio Court of Appeals held that this was 
not enough to reconcile the ordinance with a state statute that 
required there to be an underlying “act or omission as a predicate for 
culpability.”344 
3. Constitutional and Other Concerns.  Municipal parental 
liability ordinances have also been challenged on another basis: 
substantive due process. In State v. Akers, a statute was found to be 
invalid for similar reasons to the Ohio suburb ordinance: it “did not 
 
 340. S.B. 466, Wisconsin Landlord Omnibus Bill, § 704.44 (9) (Wis. 2011). See Tim 
Ballering, WI Landlord Omnibus Bill, Leases and Criminal Activity, JUST A LANDLORD (Mar. 
23, 2012), http://justalandlord.com. Initially, the statute provided that “a residential rental 
agreement is void and unenforceable if it does any of the following . . . allows the landlord to 
terminate the tenancy of a tenant if a crime is committed in or on the rental property, even if the 
tenant could not reasonably have prevented this crime.” Id. This was later modified to void 
lease terms that “[a]llow[] the landlord to terminate the tenancy of a tenant based solely on the 
commission of a crime in or on the rental property if the tenant, or someone who lawfully 
resides with the tenant, is the victim . . . of that crime.” See Tim Ballering, The New Wisconsin 
Landlord Tenant Law, Criminal Activity and Leases, JUST A LANDLORD (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://justalandlord.com/2012/03/23/wi-landlord-omnibus-bill-leases-and-criminal-activity. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Maple Heights v Ephraim, No. 90237, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2008). 
 343. See Collins et al., supra note 15, at 1340.  
 344. Id. It should also be remembered that parents of children who are bullied might have 
an available remedy in tort law. For instance, in the Georgia-based case of Boston v. Athearn, 
764 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014), parents of a seventh-grader whose classmate created a fake 
Facebook page about her brought an action against the classmate and his parents. In Georgia, 
parents can be liable for negligence when they “fail[] to exercise reasonable care to prevent a 
child under his control from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons, where he 
has knowledge of facts from which [they] should reasonably anticipate that harm will otherwise 
result.” Id. at 586 n.5 (quoting Assurance Co. of Am. v. Bell, 134 S.E.2d 540, 541 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1963) (quotation marks omitted)). 
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impose liability on the basis of any act or omission committed by a 
parent but instead imposed liability solely because of an individual’s 
status as a parent,” and was therefore found to have “violated the due 
process clause of the state constitution.”345 A parental liability 
ordinance in Trenton, New Jersey, was also struck down on 
substantive due-process grounds. There, the court noted that rather 
than being an “overriding cause of juvenile misconduct,” parental 
influence was simply one factor in a constellation of factors leading to 
such behavior.346 However, in Williams v. Garcetti,347 the court rejected 
an argument that a similar state parental responsibility law violated 
due process.348 
Although there is certainly an argument to be made that crime-
free lease ordinances violate substantive due process,349 most of the 
successful challenges have sounded in procedural due process. In one 
case, Javinsky-Wenzek v. City of St. Louis Park,350 two landlords who 
were ordered by the city to terminate a tenancy when a small amount 
of marijuana was discovered on the premises brought a Section 1983 
action against the City.351 In a proceeding seeking a preliminary 
injunction against the municipality, the court found that the landlords 
were “likely to prove that the City violated their procedural due 
process rights,” but were not likely to prove the substantive due 
process claim. The court concluded that the ordinance in question 
“did not appear sufficiently irrational or outrageous to violate 
 
 345. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 110, at 68 
 346. Doe v. City of Trenton, 362 A.2d 1200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967). The court also 
noted that, “[w]hile Euripides reminds us that the gods often visit the iniquities of the fathers 
upon the children, we are not yet prepared to say that the converse ought to be so.” Id. at 1203..  
 347. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). 
 348. Id. at 577. 
 349. Privacy and autonomy rights may be implicated, as “[t]he right of an individual to 
conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems . . . to be the heart 
of the Constitution’s protection of privacy.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 208 (1996) 
(Blackmun J., dissenting), quoted in Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 
IND. L. REV. 311, 311 (2013). Also, “the Supreme Court has enshrined several family-oriented 
rights in its jurisprudence, including rights to determine when and where to bear a child; rights 
to the care, custody, and control of one’s children; and the right to marry the person of one’s 
choice.” Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 23 (2013). 
 350. Javinksy-Wenzek v. City of St. Louis Park, 829 F. Supp. 2d 787 (D. Minn. 2011).  
 351. The marijuana was discovered during a search of the tenant’s home, which was 
conducted after their adult son, who was “not on the lease and allegedly did not reside at the 
property . . . purportedly stole a number of items from a drug dealer, including drugs.” Id. at 
790. 
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substantive due process,” and that the ruling in Rucker likely would 
stand as a rational basis for it.352 
Procedural due process has also successfully been raised against 
nuisance ordinances. In Cook v. City of Buena Park,353 the court held 
that a nuisance ordinance violated procedural due process.354 There, 
the city had ordered a landlord to evict all the occupants of a rental 
unit after a tenant’s roommate had been cited for “possession of drug 
paraphernalia.”355 The roommate successfully completed a drug-
treatment program, which resulted in no criminal conviction, but the 
city nevertheless wished to proceed with an eviction.356 The court 
found that the ordinance at issue was constitutionally infirm because 
“the notice requiring the landlord to institute unlawful detainer 
proceedings provided insufficient information to prosecute the 
action,” “the 10-day period was inadequate for the landlord to garner 
evidence to support its eviction action,” and “the ordinance required 
the landlord to prevail in the eviction action or face fines, penalties, a 
lien on his or her property, and even misdemeanor punishment.”357 
 
 352. Id. at 796. The argument that the one-strike policy “violates the substantive due process 
norm of individual guilt, which is fundamental to our concept of justice, and deeply embedded 
in our nation’s history and traditions” was rejected in Rucker. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Northern California, in Support of 
Respondents at 3, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (Nos. 00-1770, 
00-1781), 2001 WL 1699135, at *7. 
 353. Cook v. City of Buena Park, 23 Cal. Rprtr. 3d 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 354. Id. at 701. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. But see City of Peoria v. Danz, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 100819, at *1 (upholding a 
differently worded nuisance ordinance). In the nuisance context, it has been noted that cities 
have been attempting to indirectly accomplish through landlords what due process precludes 
them from doing directly. For instance, as attorney Sara Rose noted in the Lakisha Briggs case, 
“It was clear even to Norristown that a government entity cannot unilaterally kick someone out 
of their home without due process . . . so instead, they are trying to kick people out of their 
homes without due process by penalizing landlords if they don’t evict.” Anna Stolley Persky, 
Ordinance That Evicts Tenants for Seeking Police Aid Is Putting Abused Women out on the 
Street, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
ordinance_that_evicts_tenants_for_seeking_police_aid_is_putting_abused_wome. Indeed, in the 
accompanying legal proceedings, the city acknowledged that the evictions would be 
unconstitutional if they attempted to do them directly. Debra Cassens Weiss, Do Laws That 
Encourage Eviction for Repeated 911 Calls Violate First Amendment? ACLU Presses Case, 
A.B.A. J. (Sep. 19, 2013, 1:26 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/do_laws_that_
encourage_eviction_for_repeated_911_calls_violate_first_amendm. The ordinances thus appear 
to provide cities with a way “to exploit the apparently ‘private’ sphere in order to engage in 
unquestionably illegal activity,” a phenomenon that has been identified in the rendition context 
at the international level, and appears to be repeating here at the smaller, local level, as well. 
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A concurring judge in Cook v. Buena Park suggested that the 
ordinance might also violate substantive due process. The judge noted 
that in addition to the procedural due-process claim, there were 
“other, more fundamental” constitutional concerns, including the 
ordinance’s “sweeping requirement that all occupants of the premises 
must be evicted for the sins of one,” the “disparate treatment of 
property owners and renters” (particularly since the court’s “record 
reflect[ed] no nuisance abatement efforts against the owners of 
property for similar crimes”), and the “Damoclean substantive due 
process issue” looming “over this statutory scheme.”358 
In addition to the due-process concerns identified in Cook v. 
Buena Park, nuisance ordinances have also attracted challenges on 
other constitutional grounds related to domestic violence.359 In East 
Rochester, New York, two female victims of domestic violence sued 
the city on the basis that the nuisance ordinance stopped them from 
calling police for assistance, out of fear of being evicted.360 The 
impugned ordinance required landlords to evict tenants if there were 
three calls to police requesting assistance at the premises within 
twelve months, and explicitly included calls made for domestic 
violence, with no exception made for calls initiated by the person 
victimized by the behavior.361 The plaintiffs claimed that their First 
Amendment “right to petition for a redress of grievances” was 
violated, and the suits were settled with a one hundred thousand 
dollar payment and a change to the ordinances.362 
The case that the ACLU brought against Norristown, 
Pennsylvania, on behalf of evicted tenant Lakisha Briggs, also 
resulted in a settlement. Like the plaintiffs in East Rochester, the 
ACLU argued that the ordinances violated Lakisha Briggs’s due-
process rights and her First Amendment “right to petition for a 
 
Fiona de Londras, Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ Between Security 
and Rights?, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 96, 97 (2011).  
 358. Cook v. City of Buena Park, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (Besworth, J., 
concurring). “Damoclean” is a reference to a figure in Greek mythology. Damocles was forced 
to sit with a sword suspended above his head, held only by one hair. 
 359. Both landlords and tenants have potential claims against nuisance ordinances. 
Landlords may argue that the “threats of fines, property seizure, and jail time” imposed by the 
ordinances violate the Fourth Amendment. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 138. 
 360. Persky, supra note 357.  
 361. Second Amended Complaint at 1, Grape v. Town/Village of East Rochester, No. 07 CV 
6075 CJS (F), available at http://www.nhlp.org/files/Grape%20WDNY%20nuisance%202d%20
compl.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
 362. Persky, supra note 357. 
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redress of grievances.”363 The case settled for $495,000, the repeal of 
the offending ordinances, and a promise not to enact a similar law in 
the future.364 
This advocacy led to the repeal of nuisance ordinances in 
additional Pennsylvania cities, such as Mount Oliver and Forest 
City.365 Indeed, raising awareness of this issue ultimately led to a 
statewide law in Pennsylvania. Like laws prohibiting landlords from 
evicting tenants for reasons related to domestic violence that have 
been enacted in California, Colorado, Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
Washington, and New Mexico,366 the Pennsylvania law provides 
“protection for any resident, tenant, or landlord who faces penalty 
under a local ordinance because police or emergency services were 
called or responded to a situation where intervention was needed in 
response to abuse, crime, or an emergency.”367 This state law also 
“authorizes residents and landlords to seek remedies in court against 
any municipality that violates these protections.”368 
The Norristown case also attracted action at the federal level. 
The federal government brought a complaint against Norristown, 
alleging that the city’s nuisance ordinance violated the Fair Housing 
Act “by discriminating against domestic violence survivors, the vast 
majority of whom are women.”369 The complaint resulted in a 
conciliation agreement “that requires training and ongoing 
monitoring of Norristown’s activities.”370 
 
 363. Id. 
 364. Michaela Wallin, Victims of Crime No Longer Have to Fear Calling 911 in 
Pennsylvania, ACLU (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/victims-crime-no-
longer-have-fear-calling-911-pennsylvania. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Justin Henry Lubas, The Lack of Protection Available to Victims of Domestic Violence 
in Private Housing, 13–18 (Seton Hall Law eRepository, Student Scholarship, Paper No. 264, 
2013). New York is also poised to pass a similar law. Wallin, supra note 364. 
 367. Wallin, supra note 364. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) may also provide an avenue of 
challenge. It forbids “evicting tenants from federal housing for lease violations or criminal 
activity related to domestic abuse,” and some state and local laws have extended this protection 
to private housing as well. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 139. Consistent with VAWA, 
the statute authorizing the use of the one-strike policy contains an exception for domestic 
violence victims. After the Rucker decision, the statute was amended to provide protections to 
domestic violence victims. However, a lease can nevertheless be terminated if “the domestic 
violence poses an actual or imminent threat to others.” Robert Hornstein, Teaching Law 
Students to Comfort the Troubled and Trouble the Comfortable: An Essay on the Place of 
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Given these successes on the state and federal level, it seems 
likely that the use of carve-outs for domestic violence in nuisance and 
crime-free ordinances will increase.371 The question then becomes 
whether this carve-out will end up strengthening or weakening the 
remaining home rules edifice.372 Although there is a possibility that 
any domestic-violence exclusions could ironically serve to strengthen 
home rules, the increasing public awareness about these ordinances 
and the associated problems could ultimately lead to their disuse and 
demise.373 Despite the domestic-violence exclusion in the nuisance and 
crime-free ordinance context, the many problems with home rule 
ordinances in general remain, including their reliance on vicarious 
liability standards that offend notions of fundamental justice, their 
distributional impact on vulnerable populations, and their overall 
destabilizing and disruptive impact on families.374 Some courts have 
begun to denounce these ordinances, and as the public becomes more 
aware of them and begins to understand that they are “not an easy 
panacea for local problems but rather are fundamentally problematic 
 
Poverty Law in the Law School Curriculum, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1057, 1074 n.86 (2009) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(t)(6)(A)–(E) (2012)).  
 371. Although only four of the municipalities examined in the Milwaukee study excluded 
domestic violence from the list of qualifying nuisance activities (Chicago, Madison, Phillipsburg, 
and the Village of East Rochester), and thirty-nine ordinances included “assault, sexual abuse, 
battery, or domestic violence among their list of nuisance activities,” the advocacy successes on 
this front will likely result in a shift in these numbers. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 144, at 3.  
 372. A domestic-violence exclusion is obviously a positive step towards mitigating the 
impact of these ordinances on victims of domestic violence, but it is not a perfect one. Emily 
Werth notes that,  
[b]ecause of the complex ways in which domestic abuse plays out, many cases 
involving victims remain likely to fall through the cracks of such protective language. 
E.g., often when a victim of abuse calls for police help, her abuser gets arrested for 
crimes that are not self-evidently related to domestic violence or the victim herself 
even winds up being arrested; the protections incorporated in ordinances usually do 
not account for these realities. Victims whose immediate focus is on safety for 
themselves and their children may not be able to take advantage of protective 
language even if it clearly would apply to their situation.  
Emily Werth, Stemming the Tide of Crime-Free Rental Housing and Nuisance-Property 
Ordinances, 47 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 349, 350 n.5 (2014).  
 373. Several advocacy groups, including the ACLU and the Shriver Center, have “launched 
a national campaign called I am Not a Nuisance, aimed at raising awareness of the collateral 
damage caused by such ordinances and pressuring more states and municipalities to add 
additional protections for [domestic violence] victims.” Rebecca Burns, Under Local Laws, 911 
Calls Turn Domestic Abuse Victims into ‘Nuisances,’ AL JAZEERA AM. (Dec. 8, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/12/8/nuisance-ordinancesdomesticviolencevictims
.html. Also, public awareness recently played a role in defeating an antibullying parental 
liability ordinance in Carson City, California. See Muhammad, supra note 88. 
 374. For an argument that the Fair Housing Act preempts crime-free and nuisance 
ordinances, see Wroe, supra note 16. 
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policies that can generate a host of harmful effects” for tenants, 
families, and communities, municipalities may start turning away 
from home rule ordinances and towards alternative methods of 
addressing social problems.375 
B. Creating New Possibilities 
1. Questioning the Efficacy of Home Rules.  Municipalities should 
ask two questions when considering home rule ordinances: “‘are these 
policies just’ and ‘will they work.’”376 Ideally, the answer to both 
questions should be yes, but in the case of the home rule ordinances, 
the answer to both is arguably no. In any event, the fact that home 
rule ordinances are at least questionable in the first category means 
that they stand “in need of substantial justification” and the “will they 
work” question thus assumes special importance.377 Unfortunately, 
there is a dearth of information as to the effectiveness of home rule 
ordinances. Although some anecdotal evidence exists, the kind of 
sustained scientific studies that ideally anchor new laws and policies 
have not yet been conducted.378 
In regard to parental liability laws, the lack of research means 
that it is virtually “impossible to speak about whether they are a good 
tool or not.”379 No reliable research assessing the efficacy of parental 
liability statutes has been conducted, so we simply do not know much 
about their impact.380 We do, however, know that there is a link 
between poor parenting and juvenile misconduct. One study found 
that a “lack of parental supervision, parental rejection and parent-
child involvement, [were] among the most powerful predictors of 
juvenile conduct problems and delinquency.”381 However, other 
 
 375. Werth, supra note 372, at 25. 
 376. Garnett, supra note 57, at 1112. 
 377. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 110, at xiii.  
 378. This is part of a troubling trend in governance. As Garland notes, “there is now a 
recurring gap between research-based policy advice and the political action which ensues.” 
Garland, supra note 44, at 462. A similar gap between policy and empirics can be seen in the 
broken-windows policing literature. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE 
FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 8 (2001) (discussing the fact that “the famous 
broken windows theory has never been verified”).  
 379. Patchin, supra note 249. 
 380. Id.  
 381. Ralph Loeber & Magda Stouthamer-Loeber, Family Factors as Correlates and 
Predictors of Juvenile Conduct Problems and Delinquency, in 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 29–149 (M.H. Tonry & N. Morris eds., 1986) (quotation mark 
omitted). 
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powerful predictors that do not involve parenting have also been 
identified. A “high cost of living, poor standards of education, 
inadequate recreation, and slums,” as well as peer groups, have also 
been acknowledged as powerful predictors of problematic youth 
behavior.382 There is no compelling evidence that choosing to target 
parenting instead of these other contributing factors will resolve the 
issue of youth misconduct. Nor is there evidence that punishing 
parents is an effective means of improving parenting skills.383 
Anecdotally, though, Silverton, Oregon, has claimed that after 
enacting its parental liability law, the town “experienced a 44.5-
percent reduction in juvenile crime and reduced levels of truancy.”384 
On the other hand, an older U.S. Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare study comparing the juvenile crime rate in sixteen states 
with civil parental liability laws against the crime rate in states 
without them found that the juvenile crime rate in those sixteen states 
was “slightly higher than the national average.”385 Without a definitive 
empirical study supporting the proposition that parental liability laws 
decrease youth crime, dueling anecdotal evidence does not seem to 
justify the imposition of parental liability ordinances.386 
 
 382. Weil, supra note 11, at 181. 
 383. JOHN HOWARD SOC’Y OF ALTA., supra note 96. “‘We find no evidence that punishing 
parents has any effect whatsoever on the curbing of juvenile delinquency . . . . Imprisonment 
means breaking up the family; fining means depriving the child and family of sustenance.’” 
Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of Their Children: Parental Responsibility for Juvenile 
Delinquency, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303, 319 (1991) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Paul Alexander, Tort Responsibility of Parents and Teachers for Damage Caused by 
Children, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 165 (1965)). Judge Alexander presided over more than a 
thousand cases of contributing to juvenile delinquency in the 1930s and 1940s. Id. 
 384. Parental Responsibility Laws, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVES IN THE STATES 
1994-1996, http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_d.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
 385. Id. (citing Toni Weinstein, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The Legality of 
Criminal Parental Responsibility Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 878 (1991). 
 386. See id. Interestingly, one study of juveniles in detention centers focused on how those 
juveniles perceived parental responsibility. Eve M. Brank & Jodi Lane, Punishing My Parents: 
Juveniles’ Perspectives on Parental Responsibility, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 333, 333–34 
(2008). The demographics of the study suggest who is most likely to be impacted by parental 
liability ordinances: the sample of 147 children “was mostly African American (44%),” and 
“prior to living at the juvenile facility, 50.3% lived with their mother as the only parental 
figure.” Id. at 338–39. The next largest category was Caucasian (35%), followed by “Hispanic 
(not Cuban) at 8%,” and biracial or multiracial kids at 7%. Id. at 338. 20.4% lived with both 
parents, and 6.8% lived with just their fathers. Id. at 339. The youths were asked “how 
responsible do you think your parent(s) were for your activities that led to the arrest” and 
75.5% responded with “not at all responsible.” Id. at 342. However, 87.8% said that they would 
have been “less likely” to commit a crime if they knew that their parent(s) “would also be 
punished” for it. Id. 
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The efficacy of crime-free lease addendums and nuisance 
ordinances suffers from a similar lack of knowledge. First, it should 
be noted that proponents of crime-free housing ordinances often 
justify them on the basis that they are an appropriate response to the 
pressing social problem of high-crime rates in rental housing. 
However, these ordinances are sometimes passed as a means of crime 
prevention, rather than crime reduction, meaning that they are 
enacted in communities where crime is a rare occurrence. Instead, 
these communities enact these laws using the specter of a potential 
crime problem that could arise in the absence of these laws. For 
instance, Orland Park, a suburb of Chicago that enjoys a very low 
crime rate, recently adopted a crime-free ordinance. The mayor 
explained the reasons for its enactment: “It’s not so much that there’s 
major problems, but there are some problems, and we want to avoid 
problems in the future.”387 One landlord expressed skepticism that the 
purpose of the ordinance was at all connected to crime, pointing out 
that Orland Park’s particular ordinance “defines room sizes and how 
many beds are allowed per room. ‘There are things in there that I 
don’t think are relative to being crime-free,’ she said. ‘I mean, how 
much crime do we really have in Orland Park?’”388 Further, although 
Orland Park specifically acknowledged that crime was not a pressing 
social problem for its community, it should be noted that many cities 
claiming to suffer from heavy crime associated with rental housing 
rarely offer any statistics regarding the amount of crime on rental 
properties versus owner-occupied properties.389 
 
 387. Carmen Greco Jr., Orland Park Ordinance Requires Eviction of Troublesome Tenants, 
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2009, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-01-23/news/0901210789_1_
ordinance-landlords-problem-tenants.  
 388. Id. 
 389. For example, in Belleville, Illinois, “the program was implemented to help reduce 
crime in rental housing,” but “figures for criminal incidents in rental property were not 
immediately available.” Jacqueline Lee, How is the Belleville Crime-Free Program Doing? 
BELLEVILLE NEWS, Jan. 28, 2014, http://www.bnd.com/so14/01/29/3029378/committee-will-
meet-to-evaluate.html. Once the program started, there were 260 rental incidents in a two-
month period, “ranging from loud music to marijuana possession to failure to register as a sex 
offender,” and of those incidents, “12 resulted in evictions.” Id. An article on Orland Park had a 
similar combination of a belief in high-crime rates for rental housing along with a lack of actual 
evidence to support that claim. Greco, supra note 387. The article describes how city “[o]fficials 
say crimes such as drug offenses, domestic disturbances and weapons violations come mainly 
from the village’s 2,100 rental properties, although the village did not cite statistics.” Id. 
Similarly, the United Kingdom has “made tackling anti-social behavior a priority,” even though 
“the actual evidence from the Survey of English Housing and the British Crime Survey about 
the extent to which vandalism, graffiti, nuisance neighbours and teenagers ‘hanging around’ 
have become more serious problems in neighborhoods over the past 10 years is inconclusive.” 
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Nevertheless, at least some communities do seem to experience 
higher crime rates associated with rental properties. Unfortunately, it 
is difficult to assess whether crime-free and nuisance ordinances help 
to reduce the crime associated with these residential units.390 
Although some anecdotal evidence exists, it suffers from two 
significant flaws. First, the most commonly used metric is not actually 
a reduction in crime. Instead, it is a reduction in the number of calls 
for police assistance. For instance, in Collinsville, Illinois, a Crime 
Free Housing Program Coordinator reported that “results from the 
first year of the program show a 30 percent reduction in calls to police 
in ‘hotspots’ or troubled property areas.” However, during that same 
time period, the overall crime rate in “Collinsville increased by 4.2 
percent,” suggesting that calls for police assistance and actual crime 
rates may be divergent phenomena.391 Similarly, the study of nuisance 
ordinances in Milwaukee raised the possibility that measures like 
home rule ordinances simply encourage less reporting of crime, rather 
than less actual crime.392 
Second, the anecdotal evidence does not isolate the impact of 
eviction policies on the crime rate. The crime-free program is a 
multipronged approach, involving landlord training, environmental 
changes, and other interventions. Because much of the anecdotal 
evidence does not separate out the strands of a multipronged 
approach, it is very difficult to say which portion of any decrease in 
crime rates is attributable to the eviction policy and which portion is 
attributable to other interventions. Although some cities report 
having significant success with the program, these variations and flaws 
 
John Flint & Judy Nixon, Governing Neighbours: Anti-Social Behavior Orders and New Forms 
of Regulating Conduct in the UK, 43 URB. STUD. 939, 939 (2006).  
 390. It is also unclear whether individuals and families living in neighborhoods that most 
suffer the harms associated with crime support these kinds of ordinances. Some anecdotal 
evidence suggests they do. It is entirely possible, however, that something similar to the “urban 
frustration argument” that Richard Brooks described is occurring. He argued that the belief that 
the Chicago antigang ordinance was supported by the most impacted minority communities was 
false. As he writes:  
[C]laims of strong community support for Chicago’s gang-loitering ordinance have 
been challenged by Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer: “The truth is that the 
anti-loitering ordinance was intensely controversial, . . . and that to the extent one can 
identify any predominant view, Chicago’s anti-loitering ordinance was opposed by the 
very groups . . . identif[ied] as its principal supporters.”  
Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of 
Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1233 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 391. Livanos, supra note 16, at 108. 
 392. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 136. 
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in methodologies and metrics make it difficult to draw any 
conclusions from the anecdotal data.393 In the absence of reliable 
empirical research demonstrating that home rule ordinances are an 
effective means of targeting the problems of bullying, criminality, and 
drug abuse that prompted them, it is difficult to justify the use of 
these ordinances.  
2. Alternative Approaches.  In the face of this lack of evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of home rule ordinances, there is a body 
of research suggesting that not only may they be ineffective, they may 
actually be counterproductive. Sociological and criminological studies 
suggest that 
dense and robust networks of community ties and mutual trust, 
among individuals and at the community level, leads to lower levels 
of criminality. Basic social ties—family, friends, school, and 
employment—form the building blocks of informal social control, 
and at the individual level, robust social, familial, and economic ties 
 
 393. Discrepancies in anecdotal reporting are common, and because each city uses different 
variables to measure any reduction in crime rates, it is difficult to compare statistics. One source 
alleges that Mesa, Arizona, (where the program began) had a drop in crime or calls to police of 
approximately 40 percent. DIANNA GRAVES, U. REGINA CMTY. RES. UNIT CRIME-FREE 
MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM: RESEARCH SUMMARY 5 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://ourspace.uregina.ca/bitstream/handle/10294/3427/CFMH%20Summary.pdf?sequence=1. 
However, another source states that the drop in crime in Mesa, Arizona, was closer to 75 
percent. Josie Lee Villa, The Relationship Between Police and Citizen Collaboration Regarding 
Crime in Multi-Family Rental Complexes 29 (2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of 
Missouri–Kansas City). Two Canadian cities, New Westminster and Victoria, reported a 
reduction in crime of approximately 40 percent, but each used a different metric. New 
Westminster used certain kinds of “priority calls,” and Victoria used a number of different 
categories. GRAVES, supra, at 5. In other anecdotal reporting, one newspaper article suggests 
that crime-free lease addendums were effective in lowering calls to police in Des Moines, 
Washington. Keith Daigle, Des Moines Rescinds Charges to Rental Property Owners for Crime 
Free Housing Program, HIGHLINE TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.highlinetimes.com/
2010/02/25/news/des-moines-rescinds-charges-rental-property-owners-crime-free-housing-
program. The article states that “there was a 48 percent decrease in calls to rental properties 
between 2004 and 2008 [the ordinance was enacted in 2005], as compared to a 36 percent 
increase in citywide calls. Also, between 2004 and 2008, serious and violent crimes . . . went 
down 41 percent, compared to a 14 percent citywide decrease.” Id. Also, San Leandro says it 
experienced “a huge drop in crime at these communities.” CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED 
POLICING, supra note 306. And Champlin, a city of 23,000 people in Minnesota, attests that the 
result there was a 36 percent “overall reduction to calls for service and crimes.” Crime Free 
Program Testimonials, INT’L CRIME FREE ASSOC., http://www.crime-free-association.org/
testimonials.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
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are causally related to an individual’s avoidance of criminal 
behavior.394 
 Home rule ordinances, while trying to leverage those bonds, 
actually stress and weaken the “familial and social ties that work to 
curb criminal behavior.”395 Further, the end result of many evictions 
under these ordinances is homelessness, a status that has been 
directly correlated to an increase in criminality and to a negative 
impact upon communities.396 
If strong familial and social bonds and a stable home work to 
curb criminal behavior, then ordinances and policies should be 
initiated with this in mind. One appellate court noted that society has 
an interest in “safeguarding the family unit from unnecessary 
fractional pressures,” and individuals should not be made to choose 
between familial devotion or legal fealty.397 Instead of reflexively 
implementing laws like home rule ordinances, cities should first focus 
on targeting social problems through means and methods that do not 
involve penalizing people for the actions of others. 
For instance, in the context of bullying, rather than implementing 
parental liability ordinances, cities could direct their resources to 
“assist[ing] parents in need.”398 Instead of chalking up juvenile 
misconduct to “bad” parenting, an innovative city might try 
embracing a multipronged approach that targets some of the broader 
issues underlying juvenile misconduct, like a “lack of parenting skills, 
resources and community support.”399 This kind of approach could 
include things like “parenting skills programs, readily accessible 
daycare and access to social programs,” and it could have a much 
 
 394. Levy, supra note 12, at 569–70 (footnotes omitted).  
 395. Id. at 570. 
 396. Research indicates that homelessness is also directly linked to reincarceration of people 
who have served jail or prison sentences. For instance, homeless individuals on parole have 
been shown to be seven times more likely to abscond after the first month of release than those 
located in more permanent housing. Access to affordable housing has also been linked to 
decreased crime rates in low-income communities where people with criminal records often 
reside. Although reconnection with family members and establishing community connections 
can help reduce reincarceration, legal bars to allowing a family member back into the home 
after a conviction often make this impossible. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, RE-ENTRY AND 
REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO PUBLIC SAFETY 219 (2006), available at http://www.nysba.org/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26857.  
 397. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 110, at 43. 
 398. Parental Liability Laws, supra note 96.  
 399. Id.  
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more positive effect than the punitive consequences of parental 
liability ordinances.400 Rather than simply blaming parents, tackling 
some of the broader, structural issues through investment in 
“adequate housing for low-income families, quality kindergarten 
programs, support for single parent families, community centres,” 
child care, and after-school programs would enhance the goal of 
community security while creating an environment more conducive to 
human flourishing.401 
Programs that offer group counseling and mentoring to youths 
could also be useful in reducing juvenile crime and violence. A recent 
controlled study of a program that used group counseling and 
“nontraditional sports activities to strengthen adolescents’ social-
cognitive skills” found that the intervention “improved school 
performance and engagement” and resulted in a 36 percent reduction 
in arrests.402 Further, the program had an “extremely high” return on 
investment: its benefits were estimated to be up to thirty-one times 
the cost of its implementation, depending on how the societal benefit 
was measured.403 
In the context of crime more broadly, interventions that use 
focused direct deterrence, supplemented with family support, job 
training, and other forms of assistance have been remarkably 
successful at curbing crime in a number of cities.404 For instance, many 
cities with high homicide rates were able to lower those rates after 
 
 400. Id. Of course, as more cities move toward bankruptcy, these possibilities may become 
more difficult. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 
1118, 1120 (2014) (discussing the financial difficulties cities have experienced following the 2008 
recession and the subsequent reduction in services). 
 401. Parental Liability Laws, supra note 96. Although these measures would likely be 
appropriate for the majority of households, there may be a residual category of parental 
behavior that could be effectively addressed through a modified parental liability ordinance. 
When a parent’s behavior actively enables or encourages the bullying or wrongful act, some sort 
of minor civil penalty could be appropriate. Such an approach should, for the most part, track 
the approach used toward secondary liability in the criminal law. See generally GABRIEL 
HALLEVY, THE MATRIX OF DERIVATIVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2012) (discussing the 
development and theoretical grounding of criminal law’s treatment of personal and derivative 
forms of liability). 
 402. William Harms, Study: Chicago Counseling Program Reduces Youth Violence, 
Improves School Engagement, UCHICAGO NEWS (July 13, 2012), http://news.uchicago.edu/
article/2012/07/13/study-chicago-counseling-program-reduces-youth-violence-improves-school-
engagemen. 
 403. Id. 
 404. David Kennedy describes how such an intervention can work in DAVID KENNEDY, 
DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-
CITY AMERICA (2012).  
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law enforcement personnel held meetings with offenders and their 
families during which law enforcement indicated that any further 
involvement in crime would result in heavy penalties, and that job-
training support, housing help, and other forms of community 
assistance were immediately available to help transition to a crime-
free life.405 
Similarly, lessons from the public housing context suggest that a 
primary focus on fostering opportunities and targeting the underlying 
factors associated with misconduct, criminality, and drug abuse may 
be effective in some instances. Public housing authorities that have 
successfully transitioned from sites of extreme crime and violence to 
sites of decent housing have used evictions only sparingly and instead 
relied mainly on initiatives like “educational, anti-drug, resident 
participation, recreation, and scholarship programs,” and “renovation 
of housing units, increased security, and youth [and] tutoring” 
programs to accomplish their transformations.406 
Renovating housing units and improving the physical 
environment of buildings and neighborhoods has been associated 
with reduced crime rates. After upgrading the lighting and 
landscaping for one large apartment building that had been riddled 
with “youth gang violence, vandalism and drug trafficking,” and 
building a playground, basketball court, and community center for 
the complex, there was a significant decrease in crime in the area.407 
Likewise, literally “cleaning up” the streets of a neighborhood often 
cleans up the streets in terms of crime reduction as well. Examples 
abound in which neighborhoods that invest in repairing streets, 
clearing debris, weeding, and better maintaining lots and alleys 
experience a subsequent drop in crime.408 
 
 405. Id.; see also TRACEY MEARES ET AL., HOMICIDE AND GUN VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO: 
EVALUATION AND SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS PROGRAM 3 (Jan. 
2009). 
 406.  As Weil explains, “public housing success stories” from cities like Chicago, Omaha, 
and Pawtucket, Rhode Island, show that “strict eviction policies alone are not responsible” for 
helping those sites improve. Instead, “increased spending on security and social programming,” 
along with environmental upgrades like “provision of twenty-four hour foot patrols, police 
substations, improved lighting, identification card systems and single security entrances to 
buildings” were a crucial part of the success achieved. Weil, supra note 11, at 186. 
 407. Safer Neighborhoods Through Community Policing: Volume 1: Successful Initiatives in 
72 Cities, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS 23–24 (2001), http://www.usmayors.org/bestpractices/
community_policing_0401/safe_neighborhoods_1.pdf. 
 408. Id. 
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Cities can do better than home rule ordinances rooted in 
vicarious liability. Local governments are currently imposing third-
party policing through vicarious liability as a one-size-fits-all solution 
to social problems that have diverse causes and factors, and likely 
need diverse, nuanced solutions. Fortunately, cities have previously 
demonstrated their capacity to address social problems through 
creative innovations, and they should once again harness that energy 
to come up with new solutions, rather than implementing ordinances 
that further marginalize and destabilize already vulnerable groups.409 
Cities have rightly identified the home as an important site in the 
fight against bullying, criminality, and drug abuse. However, cities 
should explore and implement policies that strengthen familial, social, 
and community ties, and promote stable housing, rather than policies 
that lead to increased destabilization, disruption, and broken familial 
and social connections. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has held that the “right to maintain control” 
over one’s home, and “to be free from governmental interference” is 
a “private interest of historic and continuing importance.”410 Now, 
however, home rule ordinances are transforming the right to control 
one’s home into a duty to control all the people connected with that 
home, and deter them from engaging in wrongful conduct. That duty 
is supported by legal sanctions that apply if one fails to properly 
perform her third-party policing role. Although “even in the freest of 
societies, coercion may be a necessary evil,” one must nevertheless 
“guard against instinctive prescription of coercive solutions to every 
problem or crisis that emerges.”411 Ideally, proposed policies should 
be carefully and critically examined to determine their efficacy and 
social meaning, and most importantly, to determine “how they create 
 
 409. At the very least, municipalities should drastically circumscribe the current scope of 
these home rule ordinances. The laws should include broad exceptions for victims of crime, 
should only apply to people demonstrably under a tenant’s control, should require a conviction 
or finding of fact that the prohibited activity actually occurred, should only apply to conduct 
that presents a “substantial and direct threat to health and safety,” and should limit the 
geographical scope to the leased premises. Most importantly, the fault level should be increased 
from vicarious liability to something more akin to active participation. Letter from Sargent 
Shriver National Center on Poverty Law to Belleville City Council on Crime Free Housing 
Ordinance (Apr. 2, 2013) (http://www.povertylaw.org/advocacy/housing/pubs/letter-to-
belleville). 
 410. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993). 
 411. Ayling & Grabosky, supra note 62, at 435.  
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us as modern subjects.”412 Home rule ordinances appear to be 
proliferating without due attention to their negative impact upon 
families and social groups, and without adequate analysis of whether 
they are actually effective in bringing about the goal of security they 
seek to achieve. 
Placing responsibility for the wrongful acts of children, family 
members, and friends onto parents and heads of household constructs 
the home as a site of deviance and control. The web of third-party 
policing created by parental liability statutes, crime-free lease 
addendums, and nuisance ordinances subjects the normally private 
sphere of the family to intense internal surveillance and monitoring. 
These ordinances appear to encourage a form of microgovernance 
within the home that mimics or reproduces larger forms of law and 
order, and punishes those who fail to replicate these systems within 
their homes. The home or “the social space of the household becomes 
fully implicated in systems of surveillance and social control.”413 
Social problems such as bullying, drug abuse, and criminality 
need to be addressed, and creative and effective solutions need to be 
explored. Security is also a laudable goal, particularly in 
neighborhoods and buildings plagued by crime. However, as one 
federal judge stated, “[t]he city cannot simply start throwing innocent 
people out of private property to reduce crime in a troubled 
neighborhood.”414 The high costs of third-party policing must be taken 
into account when considering responses. Third-party policing may be 
appropriate in other contexts,415 but it may be less appropriate when 
aimed at intimate, familial, and close social relationships. The 
dystopic effect of these types of third-party-policing ordinances is 
hard to ignore: 
[I]t is chillingly apparent that compliance . . . has a direct bearing 
on . . . familial relations—that parents, children, and siblings are 
compelled, at the very least, to “modify” how they interact and 
associate with each other. Regulation and social control are deeply 
insinuated in the most ordinary of microsocial relations—who visits 
for dinner or overnight? What is his or her conduct on or off the 
 
 412. HARCOURT, supra note 378, at 242. 
 413. Mele, supra note 11, at 131–32. 
 414. Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 872 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part), vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996). Judge Robert 
L. Trott was referring to a series of housing-code sweeps in San Bernardino, California, where 
the city “faked a housing code emergency” and closed ninety-five buildings, evicting the tenants.  
 415. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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premises?—and the management of risks and their consequences 
becomes the responsibility of mothers, fathers, and teenagers. 
Likewise, otherwise innocuous visits from after-school friends, 
caregivers, and babysitters are fraught with risk. Here we see social 
regulation and control deeply insinuated in the most ordinary of 
behaviors.416 
Indeed, if we think of home building as an “ideological 
enterprise[],” then the questions of who can access and maintain 
homes, and what rules may be state-enforced there, become even 
more significant.417 Further, as the city emerges as a major source of 
rules governing homes and intimate spaces, its role in using these 
technologies of governance may become more pronounced, and may 
therefore warrant greater attention than local-government law tends 
to attract. In particular, the practical impact of these kinds of 
ordinances, alongside their symbolic participation in problematic 
histories of race, gender, and socioeconomic discrimination, raises 
concern over the narratives of responsibility and the meaning of 
“home” that they create, and the city’s role in their construction. 
 
 
 416. Mele, supra  note 11, at 132–33.  
 417. Rana Jaleel, A Queer Home in the Midst of a Movement? Occupy Homes, Occupy 
Homemaking, WHAT DEMOCRACY LOOKS LIKE, http://what-democracy-looks-like.com/a-
queer-home-in-the-midst-of-a-movement-occupy-homes-occupy-homemaking (last visited Jan. 
16, 2015).  
